



International Cooperation Mechanism for Punishing Piracy between Pakistan and China

Muhammad Farooq Abbas	Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, Liaoning, China.
Rizwana Gul	Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, KP, Pakistan.
Abdus Samad Khan	Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, KP, Pakistan.

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Corresponding Author:

Muhammad Farooq Abbas

Email: farooqabbas819@gmail.com

Abstract: The goal of this study is to examine the effective international system between Pakistan and China for the elimination of piracy. From the standpoint of general international law, this study investigates these processes concerning the crimes of robbery and piracy at the ocean. This study examines the relevance of the procedures placed on the continental strategy, with a focus on the form of such offenses. From the standpoint of global public international law, this study investigates such processes concerning the crimes of robbery and piracy at the ocean. This study demonstrates the relevance of the processes placed on the continental strategy, with special emphasis on the form of such crimes. Countries have evolved to build systems of multilateral community to be executed in the disputed sea since marine criminal actions are increasingly perpetrated beyond boundaries. It concludes that given the aforementioned legislative framework, nations are free to achieve diverse goals like ensuring navigational safety, preserving stability, or defending economic growth. Nevertheless, this does not substantially change the character of the zonal method. However, establishing a conversation platform among coastlines and user states improves marine control of maritime borders.

Introduction

Piracy is described as the act of entering ships to commit fraud or another offense, as well as the intention or capacity for using violence to accomplish that goal. There seem to be two types of violent marine acts: attempted burglary at sea, which happens inside a state's maritime boundary, and pirating, which happens outside of a country's maritime boundary. The word "piracy" refers to two separate forms of offense: hijackers, in which the goal of the assault is to seize marine vessels and their contents, and ransom, in which the ship and crews are kept hostage unless ransomware. The most common sort of marine criminality is robbery. Its objectives include various types of ships, generally at anchor or docked. The assaults are

typically spontaneous and use intimidation instead of actual abuse against defenceless personnel. The hijackers intend to seize both the ship and its payload. In such instances, or being the goal of the assault, the personnel of the objective ship is an impediment to be eliminated as soon as feasible. Most of these assaults are violent because pirates want unfettered dismantling the repainting of the seized ship. Such an infraction is lucrative, yet it is often difficult to commit. Usually, assaults target sluggish tankers and merchant ships, which take many days to offload their load. The hijack of the crews and the vessel for blackmail is the most lucrative, but it is also the most dangerous. Because ransom discussions might span months,

this is frequently a continuing operation. All types of ships are attacking. Robberies are often violent-free because it is in the pirate's interest to protect the captives alive. All hijacking and abduction need meticulous planning, information, shoreline backup, finance, and other logistic methods, frequently with the assistance of corrupted authorities. Executing the kidnapping is likewise a hard undertaking, requiring collaboration, advanced ways of communicating, and powerful weaponry to overwhelm the crew's opposition (Ahmad, 2014).

Military piracy against hijackers and ships has existed since prehistoric times, as already documented. It is mainly focused on areas with fiscal issues, a lack or inadequate administration of maritime and land rules, and social turmoil. Their incidence or manifestation varies slightly by area. When the danger of a certain sort of pirates and military ships in the area is reduced to a safe level, subsequent breakouts with some like characters are identified in other locations.

Utmost Southeast Asian nations are conscious of the risk and possible injury posed by piracy to their respective thrifths. All piracy or muggings are considered crimes in all Central Asian nations. The debate is about whether Southeast Asian coastal governments have done sufficient to combat and regulate naval piracy. Otherwise, one can question whether a Southeast Asian coastal government is required to take further actions to prevent and fight pirates in its maritime boundary and nearby waterways. Ernst, M. O., and M. S. Banks (2002). Pakistan and China have a multifaceted connection that serves as an example of harmonious cohabitation between two governments with distinct values as well as political structures. China provided financial, armed, and ideological help to Pakistan, whereas Pakistan had been autonomous China's sole trustworthy foreign partner throughout its foreign aggression. The study contends that tight links between China and Pakistan are now transitioning into a major growth network that establishes a foundation for diplomatic ties based

on economic connectedness. Because "transit" links the growth in the market also with the way of contemporary Marine Silk, the knots at Port would be essential for future marine interaction between the two nations. Growing marine rivalry in the Indian Ocean, as well as novel risks to marine stability, are prevalent. This paper discusses the evolution of Pakistan-China ties, the significance of the Indian Ocean in world politics, seaborne security challenges and responses to maritime and trade protection, as well as the rising maritime partnership among the two countries in the Indian Marine (Ernst & Banks, 2002).

The objective of the article is the following:

- a) To offer an impression of the threat of piracy and armed robbery to world trade, ships, and western civilization in particular.
- b) To investigate contemporary geopolitical efforts to prevent maritime piracy.
- c) To examine Pakistan's, India's, and China's current national methods for combating and controlling marine piracy.
- d) To examine the key issues raised by the current pirate control scheme.
- e) Research the different approaches for combatting maritime pirates.

International Collaboration within the Outline of UNCLOS

- a) Global collaboration is for the advantage of the united nations as a whole, not just the immediately associated governments or the area.
- b) Systems to ensure international collaboration.
- c) The applicable contractual countries' national law serves as the basis for international agreement.
- d) The significance of law on pertinent connections.

The goal of such an act is to outline the core tenets governing the seas, to explain the obligations of an administration, affected councils, and residents of market actors, and to develop basic

strategies in this respect. Seas as well as other important questions regarding coastal projects, developing a worldwide and methodical manner to conflict sea strategy, going to contribute to the improvement of our society and the economy of our government and citizen, in advisement to enhancing the safety of life, the seas take up a significant portion of the world, going to contribute to the togetherness of ocean waters and compassion. Here are critical aspects in maintaining the lifestyles of existing humans, which include civilization, and the reality that advancement necessitates the establishment of a new oceanic formal in consonance with constructive and peaceful advancement and the utilization of concretes within the outline of global collaborations with the safeguard of the aquatic domain, as our nation is encircled by ocean waters, worldwide efforts to accomplish it, as well as the United Nations agreement on the law of the sea (Ahmed, 2016).

The traditional and broad meaning of infringement is as follows, as per Article 101 of the LOS Convention: Counterfeiting tends to involve one of the accompanying: a) any unauthorized acts of violence or detainment by the crew for personal gain. Whatever act or chartered jet commuter, and any guideline to:

- a) At sea, towards any other planes or helicopters, or even against individuals or items on a vessel or planes and helicopters.
- b) On assets on an aircraft, aircraft, people, or places beyond a state's authority.
- c) Any active involvement in the operations of an airplane that is conscious of the circumstances that qualify it as a piracy vessel or aircraft.
- d) Any deliberate instigation or assistance of an act listed in paragraph (a) or (b) of the aforementioned treaty (Azubuike, 2009).

The Secretary of Maritime Activities of the United States Bureau of Legal Relations and the Law's Marine Division examined contemporary marine piracy in the following methods: Piracy persists today but in new ways that threaten its abolition.

Points are needed. Forum for Topical Discussion Hacker assaults is becoming more common in very many regions of the globe. Among such assaults were occasions wherein pirates stole safes, money, and jewels from sailors to the extent in which all baggage was taken and, even in some circumstances, the ship itself. Usually, just violence is utilized, although there have been fatal accidents among staff members. According to the occurrence bits of intelligence, in totalling the danger to the assaulting crew, navigational and the atmosphere were susceptible in circumstances when the squad was armed, and the airplane was left at full power. While the steals fled, no one was in charge. Exaggerated, particularly in high-traffic regions (Chang, 2010).

The preceding description is widely acknowledged as introducing or maintaining three prerequisites for the Pirate Identification Act under civil conventions. The procedure must start happening on international waters or "beyond the authority of any state," according to the first criteria. Although this criterion is often challenged, it is argued it is more in line with international law.

One contentious component of worldwide piracy regulation is the fact that it is susceptible to arbitral awards. Some states may make an informed decision on piracy, although it has absolutely nobody to do with piracy. They are, nevertheless, the adversaries of all mankind. In spite of all of the restrictions against piracy, the global constitution does not explicitly a substantive crime. However, it just lays the groundwork for governments to utilize their authority to stop piracy as recognized by international treaties. To establish the penalty for a pirate, the government always refers to its national law. This adds to the difficulty of the problem. While other states have identical provisions in respective laws, one such accord in their laws would not turn this Act into a pirate under civil conventions. In the absenteeism of a formal agreement among nations, none of them is obligated to apprehend or punish individuals for

offences committed beyond their jurisdiction. However, it is a criminal by state legislation where the perpetrator resides (Chi, 2012).

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politics, seaborne security challenges and responses to maritime and trade protection, as well as the rising maritime partnership among the two countries in the Indian Marine (Ernst & Banks, 2002).

Research Methods

The article utilizes a qualitative approach, utilizing analysis and descriptive methodologies and relying heavily on independent sources like academic research, archive, and website data. The object ends that the repercussions of Somaliland piracy for Pakistan and China's naval protection were so serious that China felt obligated to seam the united nations by participating in the transnational corporations' naval working group to counteract piracy, indicating a collaborative function while also taking advantage of the chance to strengthen ties with Somalia by restarting its ambassador and trying to engage in intergovernmental trade cooperation. Our assessment describes why so many hijackers are ejected than tried and convicted; why the United States and Naval Institution are attempting to lower prison costs; why a portion of the transport industry would like to implement the 1988 National conference against Terrorist activity at Sea; and also why others desire to relocate pirate litigation from domestic courts to a world court (Forces, (2011).

The goal of this research is to look at the need to enhance maritime domain administration, specifically about the Gwadar Port and the 21st Century Naval Silk Road. In response, this research employs an analytical and empirical method to evaluate experimental and theoretical data to analyze the relevance of maritime domain management and how it might be influenced by present maritime concerns. Furthermore, concepts within foreign politics, regional identity, conceptualism, and serious security research methodology complement the key premise of "reinforcing maritime domain management".

The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), in collaboration with the Pakistan Navy, is in charge of preserving order in Pakistani seas. MSA was founded in 1987 as a military unit to defend Pakistan's EEZ from unlawful exploitation and to enforce national and global naval regulations in Pakistan's seas. The power has a large number of assets, counting helicopters, hovercraft, and over a dozen swift patrol boats. The major goal of the agency is to suppress piracy laterally on the coastline, and then its actions are restricted to regional seas. When most people reason of pirates and Porcelain, they see pirates from periods ago. Unfortunately, piracy is a contemporary phenomenon that presents a danger to worldwide commerce, and China is very interested in combating it. As a crime, and that does not exist. There is no specific description of piracy" (Chi, 2012).

Analysis

This study will look at the process of collaboration in the fight against piracy between Pakistan and China. China's trade relations are quite extensive. To highlight the major consequences of increased collaboration among Pakistan and China in the battle over piracy, the worldwide exertion to combat piracy must be considered from two perspectives: The worldwide system of law establishes a structure for the regulation of piracy and collaboration in combating piracy. Global collaboration may be divided into two categories. For starters, it relates to collaboration between businesses and private groups, like the IMB and the Worldwide Oceanic Commission (CMI). Subsequent, it relates to combined activities made by nations and worldwide governments, such as the IMO and ASEAN. One example of global collaboration is adjacent nations working together to combat piracy, Murphy (Goswami, 2015).

Strategic connections, especially about India, remain at the core of Sino-Pakistani relationships. However, commercial collaboration has risen to the top of the agenda in

the last two years with the construction of CPEC. In addition, time, as China's interest in Afghanistan has grown, so takes its involvement with Pakistan on problems relating to Afghanistan's stability and the regional danger of terrorists (Goswami, 2015).



Figure 1. China's Projected New Silk Streets

Source: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015

International Law

International laws and proposals have tackled maritime piracy and aggravated burglary at sea under civil conventions. Some treaties and conventions have specific clauses ranging from technical piracy and armed robberies against vessels, while others may be adjusted or thought about in the diagnosis of such crimes, but since they relate in one manner or the other to offenses that are near or comparable to maritime robbery and piracy against ships, or that are addressing problems regarding the definition of certain offenses, demonization, apprehending, and prosecuting pirates and arsonists. In the next section, it is worthwhile to examine, using established components of analysis, those trade conventions and suggestions that have resulted in some progress in the fight against such two offenses to find legal factors for the formation of national law (Goswami, 2015).

Judicial Procedure and Human Rights Matters

As stated beforehand, worldwide law allows conditions to proscribe and establish authority over maritime security and aggravated robbery cases involving ships. As a result, to decide on the matter, they must undergo a trial system that is established by a national legal system and procedures. In general, it comprises apprehension and interrogation (typically conducted by law enforcement), prosecution, trial, and jail. Aside from the domestic procedural requirements that must be modified to address marine pirate and aggravated robbery cases, human rights problems within the court process must also be lectured. Certainly, the (UNSCR) 2015 demands that judicial proceedings be consistent with worldwide social moralities law. The idea of human rights (UDHR) guarantees all specific personal fairness of rights and dignity, exclusion from torturing or violent, coldhearted, or systematic torture, fair conduct, and non-exposure to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, or deportation as the foundation of equality legislation (Gottlieb, 2013).

a) In 2019, the International Marine Bureau's Piracy National Institute reported more occurrences of piracy and armed robberies involving ships than in 2018. Based on the most recent IMB statistics, the occurrences involved four hijacked planes, ships, assaults, and 130 planes on board. Even though the general decrease in piracy and armed robbery is positive, ships pose a danger to numerous locations, such as the Coast of Guinea. The number of kidnapped people in the Gulf of Guinea climbed from 78 in 2018 to 121 in 2019. This translates to more than 90% of all abductions worldwide in the fourth quarter of 2019, with 64 crew members taken in six distinct cases. In addition to four hijackings in 2019, the area was accountable for events, including ten ships believed to be on fire. Armed robbery assaults rose in the Singapore Strait in 2019, with instances recorded in the fourth quarter of the year. In 2018, there were simply three incidences in the same location (Halberstam, 1988).

b) Objects 100 to 107 of the United States agreement Nations Conference on the Regulation of the Sea permit international collaboration against piracy and armed robbery. "All Governments should assist to the greatest degree feasible in the suppression of pirates on the open seas or any other area beyond the authority of any State," states Article 100. However, neither "cooperate" nor "to the greatest degree feasible" are defined elsewhere in the Convention, leaving flexibility for each State Party to "cooperate" as they see proper. Thus, a State Party could choose whether or not to bring in naval vessels; and if military vessels are committed, and arrests are made, the State Party may choose whether to pay prosecution expenses, keep the suspects before turning them over to a third nation, or just let them go. And, as we've seen, the former is often chosen (Hallwood & Miceli, 2011).

c) The context for this article is that extra apprehended naval adventurers have been freed by the ships that caught them in 2010 and then were handed over for action. Designers do not assume that established ad hoc interpretations for this bomb are complete, particularly regarding that many Contracting Conditions have not incorporated applicable worldwide law (Articles 100–107 of the 1982 United International Agreement on the Regulation of the Sea) into countrywide regulation, and that sign is frequently inadequate to accuse respondents. Somewhat, we make the broader case that oceanic policing, as guided by present worldwide law, is a public benefit that suffers from free-rider issues. That is, while no one State Party's shipping can be exempted from the advantages of lower crime caused by other State Gatherings' enforcement expenditures, inducements for all players to spend in compliance at an optimum equal are insufficient. We take claimed, in particular, that dislike to experiencing significant

advantages to others contributes to understanding why States Parties are hesitant to incorporate universal law into domestic law, as well as why there is a personal taste for releasing detained defendants pretty than experiencing the outflow of having to put them on experimental and incarcerating them. (Ho, 2009)

- d) Though preventive, dissuasion, and prosecution are important tactics for

combating maritime piracy, attempts to eliminate the issue are hampered by a variety of hurdles, including economic, economic, geopolitical, and legal. Given the fundamental concerns at risk, as stated in Part I of this research, as well as the related direct prices and second-order ramifications, successfully dealing with the problem of naval security remained a key initiative.

Table 1.

Types of Piracy Attacks and Violence, 2006–2010

Types of Piracy Attacks	Years				
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Attempted	56	62	47	85	89
Boarded	162	169	151	155	196
Fired upon	7	14	46	121	107
Hijacked	14	18	49	49	53
Total	239	263	293	410	445
Assaulted	2	29	7	4	6
Hostage	188	292	889	1050	1181
Injured	5	35	32	69	37
Kidnap/Ransom	77	63	42	12	20
Killed	15	5	11	10	8
Missing	3	3	21	8	–
Threatened	17	6	9	14	18
Total	317	433	1011	1169	1270

Source: ICC IMB 2006–2016 Annual Reports

Table 2.

Nationalities of ships attacked, January – December 2015–2019

Flag state	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Antigua and Barbuda	9		3	2	2
Australia	1				
Austria					1
Bahamas	5	5	6	9	4
Bangladesh		1		1	
Barbados				2	1
China				2	2
Comoros	1				
Cook Island					1
Croatia		1			
Germany					1

Ghana	1			2	
Hong Kong					
India	2	3	4	1	
Indonesia	2	4	1	1	1
Iran	1		1		
Italy				3	
Japan		1		1	
South Korea	1	1			1
Malaysia	12	6	4	7	3
Malta	11	5	8	7	10
Nigeria	2	4	2	1	6
Niue					1
Norway	1	3	4	1	3
Panama	38	46	27	27	17
Saudi Arabia	1	2	2	1	4
Thailand	5		3		
Turkey		1			1
Total Year	93	83	65	68	59

Source: ICC IMB piracy and armed robbery against ships – 2019 Annual Report

Capability Expansions because of Contributing to Counter-Piracy Processes

- a) Pakistan recently closely monitored its seaside throughout 2002. In 2004 and 2009, the government extended its naval activities to participate in Task Forces 150 and 151, respectively. Over time, the Pakistan Navy gained strong capabilities to participate in multinational missions (¹ Hofmeister, 2014).
- b) A few non-governmental organizations in Pakistan have learned how to negotiate with piracy. The MV SUEZ and seven Pakistani team members of the MV ALBEDO were released after a transferred ransom was paid. These agreements taught these NGOs valuable lessons. GOs were able to generate more than \$4 million in public contributions. This is a tremendous endeavor since other nations' benefactors could not replicate it (Hribernik, 2013).
- c) In October 2012, Pakistan promptly issued its Regulations for Personally Contractually Armed Security Officers (Iftikhar, 2016).
- d) Pakistan created the Joint Maritime Evidence Coordination Centre in Karachi in February

2013. JMICC collects and disseminates the necessary information to all relevant stakeholders for maritime security understanding (Joubert, 2013).

- e) The Pakistani government is negotiating memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with neighbouring nations to expand collaboration in the marine security arena. The Department of Defence is also involved in anti-piracy activities via the (SAARC) (Lain, S. and Pantucci, R. 2016).

Security-piracy and Pakistan's Associations with the Near Countries

Pakistan's two closest marines, India and Iran, have indeed joined anti-piracy measures. The Indian Navy (IN) and the Islamic Iranian State Navy (IRIN) have both engaged in similar missions on their own and are neither members of any alliance. The Indian Navy is a member of the SHADE (Sharing Understanding and De-confliction) system, which is managed by NAVCENT Dubai. As a result, PN and IN are aware of one other's anti-piracy actions. IRIN is not usually a component of the SHADE process.

Palgrave Macmillan (2018). Pakistan's leadership of Response Teams 150 and 151 has benefited the Gulf nations, including Yemeni, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the acknowledged administration of Somalia. They applaud Pakistan's tenacious exertions in Mission Forces 150 and 151. Taking Pakistan's lead, several regional authorities have joined CMF and anti-piracy operations. Accord on Security Cooperation in Trying to combat Piracy and Attempted Burglary Involving Ships in Asia (Laska, M. N. 2012).

Regional Collaboration Contract on Opposing Piracy and Armed Robbery Beside Ships in Asia

Former to the significant increase in piracy off the shore of Sumatra, Southeast Asia, in especially, was renowned as a pirate. As a way of result, on November 11, 2004, the first multinational provincial pact to fight piracy in Asia, the Mutual Recognition Contract on Trying to combat Piracy and Attempted Burglary involving Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), was approved. The Convention went into effect on September 4, 2006, and there are now 19 Constricting States (Maqsood, 2017).

In ReCAAP, Participate is obligated to preclude and repress piracy and aggravated burglary beside naval vessels to the largest amount likely, to apprehend pirates or citizens who already have dedicated attempted robbery in contradiction of ships, to confiscate ships or planes and helicopters used for having committed piracy or aggravated burglary against aircraft, to capture ships chosen to take by and below the direct authority of pirates or individuals who have decided to commit assault and robbery against naval vessels and to seize the property on platform those very vessels (Marex, 2018).

The settlement similarly created the ReCAAP Knowledge Transfer Centre that was publicly opened in Singapore on November 29, 2006, and known as an independent entity on January 30, 2007. 179 Among some of the features of the ISC are the expedient distribution of data relating to occurrences of armed robberies and piracy

against naval vessels within and between the Signatory States, the compendium and examination of data on armed robberies and piracy against ships, and the preparedness and propagation of facts and figures to foster a greater knowledge of the situation in China. When there is a legitimate justification for thinking that there is an immediate danger of pirate or aggravated burglary against ships, the ISC should issue relevant notifications to States Parties (Mo, 2002).

In addition to the responsibilities stated above, ReCAAP necessitates collaboration among Signatory Countries via ISC, which is usually to promote sharing of evidence amongst main elements selected by every State via a protected internet-created communication web organization (INS). Detainment of pirates to some other Public Authority with authority, mutual legal help in serious offences, institutional capacity to help stop and repress piracy, and encouraging ship owners to take security precautions against armed theft and piracy against patrol boats are all extra requirements for collaborations (Mukundan, P. 2003).

Universal armed and maritime reply to piracy

Marine and naval factors are important in deterring and combating pirate and aggravated burglary at sea. They provide secure transit for commercial ships in high-risk zones, protecting the vessel, its freight, and its personnel from the plague of pirates and enabling trade and commerce to proceed uninterrupted. In its resolution 2020 (2011), the Nations Security Council praised the attempts of the European Government's Procedure Atalanta, NATO's Activities Ocean Safeguard and Allied Preserver, the Consolidated Task Force 151 of the Consolidated Nautical Services, as well as other Countries trying to act in overall terms in partnership with TFG and each other in order repress counterfeiting and protect innocent ships attempting to cross done the seawaters

surrounding the coast of Somalia. I. S. C. ReCAAP, I. S. C. (2012).

States like as China, India, the Islamic State of Iran, Japan, Malaysia, the Laopublics' independent nation, the Russian Alliance, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen have also sent individual soldiers

In September 2011, the worldwide delivery sector (supported through the round table of transshipment organizations) requested the deployment of a United States force of active soldier protectors to be organized in modest facts onboarding vessels transiting the Suez Channel.

International Commission Force-151

Another international naval mission power, the Multinational Task Force¹⁵¹ (CTF¹⁵¹)¹⁹¹, was formed in rejoinder to pirate assaults in shipment channels off the coastline of Somalia. It proposed that, though NATO and the European Union tasks used a "Western approach" to pirate reduction, CTF¹⁵¹ would take an "Eastern approach." Militaries, C. M. (2011).

To discourage threats in the Gulf of Aden and safeguard delivery in the area, CTF 151 constructed the International Suggested Transit Corridor (IRTC), which also extends 464 nautical miles from the Babui Mandeb strait trying to separate the Red Sea since the Gulf of Aden just to north of the Island chain of Socotra. The navigation corridor is separated into sections, and marketable and personal ships transiting by them are watched and accompanied by different naval contingents from the Navy, U.S. (2009).

Findings

Maritime Security Governance

Maritime Safety Administration entails methods for specified marine authorities to react to specified dangers in conformity with state rules and legislation. And marine security may be defined as the protection of sea routes (SLOC), decent supremacy at sea, and peaceful operations for seaborne commerce. Given the complexity of

cybercrime in the oceans nowadays, nations recognize the limits of traditional maritime security protocols. Due to the high number of criminalities committed in the seas that occur exterior of a state's disputed sea, worldwide naval assets and other cooperative safety precautions have now become critical. Maritime security administration is critical for Pakistan in light of global security problems and its connection to Since 2004, the Pakistan Navy has taken a proactive role in the Indian Oceanic area, engaging in joint task force exercises to address the concern regarding such terrorist pirates (ISPR). The Pakistan Navy has expanded collaboration and assistance in worldwide cooperative safety rules in the naval sector to fight violence and piracy via Mutual Mission Force 150: which seeks to combat intimidation in the seas, with actions in the Buzzer of Africa and the North Arabian Oceanic (mutual oceanic militaries, 2016).

Mutual Task Power 151: a piracy-fighting force with operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Somali Descend Militaries, C. M. (2016).

Pakistan's reaction to the defense of regional seas has been via the Pakistan Shore Protectors, who are vigorous throughout Pakistan's coastlines of Sindh and Balochistan, battling crimes such as social trading and the rustling of guns and drugs (Pakistan Army). And the Pakistan Naval Safety Activity, which is a division of the Pakistan Navy and operates freely, demeanors actions such as national and worldwide naval law implementation, mountain rescue, protection of marine containers in the area from intimidations, preserving interpersonal and inter and offshore steering tools, and protecting the Limited Financial Sector.

The contemporary literature provides clarity and a strong stance on global crimes, notably piracy and sea intimidation. It is clear that transnational crimes at sea, notably terrorism, have been exaggerated in many ways, which also serves as a barrier to practical policy consequences. In

Pakistan's case for stronger maritime security administration, the Seaport of Gwadar and MSR are vital to seaport security and haven, as well as harmony in the waterways for shipping operations. Experience from Pakistan's past navy commanders and senior leadership is essential in developing the key argument's strong analytic approach. Good order in the Indian Ocean area, according to Admiral (R) Noman Bashir (2014), is a problem since terrorism in the seas confronts challenges from Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Somali radicals in the Arabian Oceanic Area, and the Islamic National functioning in Iraq and Syria. Insurrectionaries, as of various groups, are acting in the waterways while also trafficking persons for instruction, weaponry for combat, and drugs for profit. According to Admiral (R) Asif Sandila (2014), the Port of Gwadar not only benefits China and world trade, but it is also projected to improve Pakistan's domestic substructure and budget via manufacturing expansion, new railing and road linkages, and other expansions. He further claims that, although piracy is a risk in the Malacca Straits, Somali pirates are active in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. Baloch patriotism is another factor to consider when it comes to the cybersecurity of the Port of Gwadar since instructions in the past have included assaults on Chinese engineers and the destruction of value systems and equipment onshore. This is crucial to notice for two reasons: first, the seamless running of the seaport, and second, Pakistan's reaction to protection in Gwadar, which is also significant to the Chinese (Kahandawaarachchi 2015).

Conceivable fears of Port of Gwadar and saleable activities in Pakistan's waters:

- i. Terrorism, ammunition, drugs, and persons are smuggled within industrial shipments.
- ii. Ships' kidnapping.
- iii. Attacks on boats transporting petrochemicals/LNG.
- iv. Oil tanker attack.

- v. Attack Gwadar port's onshore infrastructure, like the LNG facility.
- vi. Insurgents are planning an assault on the port's land.
- vii. Unlawful Fishing

Strengthening Security Operations Governance plays into Pakistan's overall strategy, which is now focused on sustaining marine stability and harmony while progressing toward economic success. All of these elements are linked to an efficient marine security structure that boosts current capabilities for combatting transnational threats. Other viewpoints in international relations, such as regionalism, structuralism, and significant security studies, are investigated to support their stance on the need to enhance Security Operations Governance.

Attempts to foster better worldwide collaboration

In light of the public benefit character of maritime regulation, it was claimed in the previous section that the Contracting States would tend to underinvest in its supply. Therefore, if marine controlling is to be supplied at everything like an informally desirable level, expanded international collaboration beyond the obligations completed in the Resolution on the Regulation of the Sea paper 100 to 107 must be arranged. In reality, multiple such attempts are made. The United Nations Safety Convention passed Resolves 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851 in 2008, exhorting Conditions Gatherings possessing ships in the Buzzer of Africa region to collaborate and make stronger efforts to arrest and prosecute piracy. Settlement 1816 authorized states going to cooperate with the Somali Provisional Government (STG) to continue pursuing Somali pirates trendy Somalia's state waters; Settlement 1838 implored Public Bodies to defend shipments involved in World Food Programme implementation; Resolve 1846 protracted the period during which Provinces Festivities naval vessels possibly will gain entry Somalia's maritime boundary; and Pixel density 1851 authorized Public Bodies to keep pursuing

Somali adventurers on shore. However, neither of these agreements compelled States to increase their generally pro activities (Murphy, 2012).

Discussion

Multinational crimes on the high seas continue to pose a threat to nautical protection. However, several areas must be thoroughly evaluated before developing a realistic approach for boosting freedom of navigation administration. Piracy, maritime security, and smuggling are three key concerns in the seas, and they have considerable research that has assisted examine: 1) the Constraints of marine terrorists, b) the Significance of mutual defense, c) Pirates in the Indian Ocean are not completely eradicated d) Trafficking may be used to fund criminal activities, utilize armaments, and recruit young recruits f) Offshore oil and gas port security is just as vital as maritime safety.

A variety of elements must be considered while developing a strategy for maritime domain administration. Whereas the Pakistan Army has made certain attempts like involvement in the unified mission strength, there is still room for improvement in communal haven actions. Several difficulties to maritime protection exist in both offshore gas; the former confronts risks to port infrastructure and facilities, while the latter encounters dangers to sea commerce.

Recommendations

1. Pakistan must develop professional knowledge to monitor global maritime debates.
2. Pakistan should also increase its involvement in CGPCS Working Committee. She must also distribute information regarding Pakistan's aggressive aquatic actions in Mission Militaries 150 and 151 at worldwide diplomacy.
3. The installation of a huge (HRA) over like an extensive historical has harmed Pakistan's marine commerce and activity. CGPCS

should push IMO and UKMTO to assess HRA regularly and change HRA dynamically based on environment and pirate activities during the last six months. The scope of HRA should be reviewed at each CGPCS request come.

4. Integrating cutting-edge technology and systems, including undersea and aerial observation and a communication wherein the message biometric authentication system.
5. Launching both national and regional cooperative security measures, beginning with local public agencies and progressing to MSR member nations.
6. Adopting best performance following UNCLOS, the ISPS Code, and the World Taxes Association.

Conclusions

The expertise gained through worldwide efforts to prevent nautical piracy has proven to be quite helpful in addressing pirate issues. This paper investigates the positives and negatives of existing multinational efforts to fight pirates to evaluate potential future avenues for countering and restraining pirate activity in Southeastern Asian waters. It is an important victory for the Pakistan Navy, and it will help to open the path for more collaboration in the South Asian area. Due to the joint venture between China and Pakistan known as the Pakistan-China Monetary Strip below China's Belt and Road Creativity," Pakistan is becoming increasingly attractive to other countries in the context of the existing world politics. These countries are aware of the regional and global importance of Pakistan. The Comprehensive and Efficient (CPEC) consists of a system of infrastructures and railways, a variety of liveliness schemes, the expansion of Gwadar Port, industrial cooperation, cable, planned superior financial regions, and common area expansion schemes. The expansion of Gwadar Port, which is a significant quality for Pakistan and is a primary component of the China-

Pakistan Financial Access strip, is at the centre of the (CPEC) project. It is the linchpin that holds the whole Belt and Road plan together. To ensure the safety of this region in light of the anticipated exponential growth in the amount of marine commerce passing through Gwadar Port, the Pakistani Navy has created Special Task Force-88. It is possible to claim that the achievement of CPEC is dependent on the marine security that it provides.

The theory of constructivism in international relations attempts to explain the personal and social factors that play a role in international relations. These factors are a consequence of characteristics and philosophies rather than high quality grounded on influence or the assistance of material goods. (Jackson and Nexon 2002). As per Hurd (2008), the creative method was fruitful in this field because it focuses on the common content that is complicated in the manufacture of worldwide relatives, which includes state interests. This has allowed the constructivist approach to be successful in this area. Under conditions of mutual trust, states will likely be able to cooperate and produce positive results while using this technique. In terms of the relationship between Pakistan and China, it has strengthened considerably since the 1950s. Since that time, there has been a solid account of social connections, sustenance, skill, and now expansion in the oceans below the banner of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The expansion of the Seaport of Gwadar is predicated on two priorities that are shared by both Pakistan and China; these priorities are economic-social progress and prosperity.

As a result of the fact that uninterrupted operations at the Port of Gwadar and in the Arab ocean are essential to the success of the MSR creativity as a whole, maritime security governance continues to be an essential component. As a result, there is a necessity for an efficient mechanism given that Pakistan's overarching policy aims to cooperate in the naval zone and also to maintain transnational threats. It

is an important victory for the Pakistan Navy, and it will help to open the path for more collaboration in the South Asian area. Pakistan is becoming increasingly attractive to other countries in the context of the contemporary international political environment. These countries are aware of the geostrategic importance of Pakistan. The expansion of Gwadar Seaport, which is both a significant advantage for Pakistan and a central component of the (CPEC), is at the centre of China- (CPEC). It is the linchpin that holds the whole Belt and Road plan together. To ensure the safety of this region in light of the anticipated exponential growth in the amount of marine commerce passing through Gwadar Port, the Pakistani Navy has created Special Task Force-88. It is possible to claim that the sustainability of CPEC is dependent on the marine protection that it provides.

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