



Post 9/11 Diplomatic Reunification of Pakistan and the U.S.

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Abstract: *The events on September 11, 2001, changed the geopolitics of the world and caused diplomatic ties to be rebalanced everywhere. The strategic, political, and military ramifications of Pakistan's and the United States' diplomatic reunion after 9/11 are examined in this paper. We look at the background that caused the two countries to become apart and the sharp change in their relationship after the attacks. The article explains how Pakistan's participation in the U.S. campaign against terrorism ushered in a new phase of bilateral interaction. It explores the difficulties and complexity of this alliance, including problems with sovereignty, security, and regional stability. The paper will also examine the long-term effects of this diplomatic reunion on the geopolitical environment of South Asia generally and Pakistan-U.S. relations specifically. By means of this analysis, the paper highlights the continuous significance of Pakistan-U.S. ties in the framework of global security and provides insights into the changing dynamics of international diplomacy in the post-9/11 period.*

Introduction

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States soon came to the conclusion that Al Qaeda was responsible for the assaults and that a war was bound to take place in Afghanistan (ROYAL NAVY, 2004). At that time Al Qaeda was situated and was being protected by the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan. Given the geopolitical environment, the United States of America desperately needed Pakistan's cooperation for the war; but, on the eve of September 11, 2001, the United States and Pakistan were not even close to becoming allies (Maizland, 2006). In point of fact, Pakistan had very few international contacts with the United States, other than the fact that it was the target of several sanctions. With the help of a combination of realistic threats and incentives, the United States was able to win Pakistan's support for the war in a matter of days, despite the fact that their relationship has become increasingly strained. The purpose of this case study is to examine the diplomatic efforts of the

United States in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and to demonstrate how their use of coercive diplomacy was successful in gaining Pakistan's support. The study will provide a concise analysis by presenting a brief overview of the collaboration between Pakistan and the United States. This is essential as it demonstrates the intermittent and occasional connection that has prevailed between the two countries over the past six decades. Pakistan's motivation for this connection stems from its desire to acquire resources and political support to fuel its competition with India. On the other hand, the United States is driven by a broader strategic calculation.

The article will focus to describe the state of affairs in Pakistan on the eve of September 11th, 2001: a nation that is in utter disarray as a result of a recent coup and is in dire need of financial aid. After that, I will discuss the negotiations that took place between the two countries, as well as the

outcomes of those negotiations. In the next section, I will examine the diplomacy as an example of coercive diplomacy and explain the reasons why the United States was successful. In conclusion, I will discuss the valuable lessons that can be gleaned from this particular incident for future diplomatic endeavors.

Research Objectives

This study examines Pakistan-US diplomatic reunion after 9/11. The primary aim of the article is to examine the circumstances that led to the reestablishment of a strategic alliance between the two states, including geopolitics, military cooperation, and counterterrorism. The research also tries to identify the main difficulties and potential of this restored alliance and assess its effects on regional security and international diplomacy. The study examines Pakistan-U.S. relations post-9/11 to better understand international interactions in an era of global security concerns.

Significance of the Research

The study's relevance is seen in its analysis of Pakistan and the US diplomatic reconciliation following the September 11 attacks. Through an examination of this crucial change in international relations, the paper clarifies the security alliances and strategic realignments that arose in reaction to international terrorism. Gaining knowledge of the mechanics of this reunion helps one to better understand modern geopolitics, South Asian regional stability, and the intricate interactions between political, military, and diplomatic objectives. In the end, this study adds to the larger conversation on international diplomacy in a post-9/11 environment and emphasizes the need of international cooperation in tackling global security issues.

Literature Review

A Concise Overview of the US-PK Relationship

Understanding the relationship between the two countries during the last 60 years is essential to comprehending the diplomacy that the United

States adopted after 9/11 (Ahmad, 2015). While the bilateral relationship between several countries and the United States fluctuates, Pakistan has experienced the most significant fluctuations. Historically, the personal relationships between the military or military-dominated government of Pakistan and the Washington policy apparatus, mostly directed by the White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA, were characterized by single-issue contacts that were often brief and unexpected in duration. During the Cold War in the 1950s, Pakistan was "America's most allied ally" in halting Soviet expansion (Sunawar et al., 2015). Pakistan was the next country Washington turned to halt Communist expansion after India decided against aligning itself. But during the 1960s, relations soured, particularly as Pakistan went to China for help while the United States supported India in a conflict with China (Khan, 2011). Shortly after Pakistan assisted the United States in opening its Embassy in Beijing in 1970–1971, cooperation momentarily resurged (Dawn, 2011). Again, the relationship reached a low point in 1977 when the Pakistani authorities watched as mobs destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and other information centers. As Pakistan advanced its nuclear program in 1979, the Carter administration imposed sanctions and ended U.S. economic and military assistance, therefore severing the partnership through the end of the decade.

Despite the significant decline, the relationship quickly improved in the early 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the establishment of the second U.S.-Pakistan alliance (Weinbaum, 1991). Pakistan's utilization of proxy warfare in Afghanistan has expanded to involve the United States as a partner. The United States selected Afghan religious radicals as their partners; they received military support from the United States and were trained by the CIA and the Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) of Pakistan. The fight against the Soviet Union overshadowed the U.S. interests in Pakistan, which included limiting the Pakistani nuclear program, pushing Pakistan

toward a more democratic regime, preventing an India-Pakistan crisis, and halting the drug trade (Tellis, 2017). The sole other accomplishment of the United States during the 1980s was the suppression of the drug trade coming from Pakistan. The United States disregarded Pakistan's uneven economic growth, failing educational system, and rising Islamic militancy throughout this second partnership. Radical Islamists were the greatest combatants in Afghanistan, which the Reagan administration considered to be a threat to the U.S.S.R. but not to the U.S., hence it was not concerned about their effects. With the Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States stopped seeing a strategic interest in the area. The fact that under Mikhail Gorbachev, U.S.-Soviet ties were strengthening only served to strengthen this conviction. As a result, the relationship with Pakistan rapidly soured because the Soviet Union was the sole reason the two nations ever united. The Pressler Amendment brought in sanctions in August 1990. The U.S. President was obligated under this 1985 law to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons; failing to do so, Pakistan would lose the majority of its US military and economic support (Akhtar, 2017). It so happened that the President declined to certify Pakistan in 1990, the year the United States decided it no longer needed Pakistani cooperation.

The United States implemented a second round of sanctions in May 1998 as a response to a series of nuclear tests, utilizing the 1994 Glenn Amendment, which allows sanctions on non-nuclear weapon states that conduct nuclear explosions, and the Symington Amendment, which prohibits military and economic aid to any country involved in the transfer or receipt of nuclear assistance (PANDEY, 2023). Upon the overthrow of the government by Musharraf's army in October 1999, the "Democracy Sanctions" were ultimately enforced. The United States invoked Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit any form of military and economic aid from being provided to Pakistan. Sadly, these sanctions were strong enough to be viewed as an insult but too feeble to have any effect on

Pakistan's behavior.¹² The United States, meantime, gave Pakistan little reason to adapt. Without American economic support, Pakistan's institutions crumbled, it ran up enormous debt, and extreme Islamic groups were still being nurtured. The Soviet exit sparked a power war in Afghanistan, from which the Taliban emerged triumphant in 1996 (BBC, 2010). Following the Gulf War in 1991, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and began his "jihad" against the country and its American allies. Forced to flee, Bin Laden traveled to Sudan, where U.S. pressure led to his expulsion in 1996. He next proceeded to Afghanistan, where he became intimate with the Taliban. Long after the United States left, Pakistan kept meddling in Afghan affairs. They had so developed a friendly relationship with the Taliban and were one of just three nations to acknowledge the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government.

Establishment of the NATO

Military alliances formed by both superpowers were one aspect of Cold War politics (LEEDS et al., 2007). These were the Western block's NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Eastern block's WARSAW Pact. In 1949 NATO was founded, and the United States provided the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine as part of its containment of Communism after World War II (McCauley, 2021). Twelve members at first: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. NATO members were Turkey and Greece in 1952, West Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, Poland in 1999, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1982 (Little, 2023). Currently, some European countries are awaiting admission to an expanded NATO, as the United States had envisioned.

The NATO members agree to see an assault on any one of them as an attack against all, and each member is required to support those attacked by using any means, including the use of

armed force, as it sees fit to restore and preserve the security of the North Atlantic region. They consent to avoid economic confrontation, to use peaceful methods to resolve conflicts between themselves, and to strive for mutual economic benefit. NATO was founded mostly to offer collective defense against the Soviet menace. NATO ran smoothly all through the Cold War. It is the only military coalition that has endured the post-Cold War era. Right now, the US needs NATO to maintain its superpower status.

Pak-US Ties on the Eve of September 11

There was a very poor relationship between the United States and Pakistan on the eve of 9/11 (Khan, 2019). Relations between the United States and Pakistan deteriorated for a variety of reasons, chief among them Pakistan's backing of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Under the Pressler, Glenn and Symington Amendments as well as the "Democracy Sanction," which restricted all military and economic assistance to Pakistan, Pakistan was facing a number of U.S. sanctions. Worse, the United States was establishing strong diplomatic and strategic relations with India, Pakistan's most despised adversary. Inside Pakistan, things were in disarray. It had an underdeveloped economy, a shoddy educational system, a weak institutional structure, a political process that was stillborn after a recent coup, and internal strife as Islamist extremism rose. Pakistan's massive debt, faltering economy, and underdeveloped public school system—which contributed to the 44% literacy rate—put the country in a "position of extreme vulnerability," according to the World Bank.

US Engagement with Pakistan Following the Incident

Al-Qaida terrorists took four aircraft on September 11, 2001, smashing two into the World Trade Towers and a third into the Pentagon (Boatner et al., 2021). Before the fourth aircraft could finish its objective, it was forced down in a Pennsylvanian field. This was the biggest terrorist strike ever carried out on American territory and

the single biggest in history overall. It did not take the United States long to conclude that al-Qaida was to fault. The Taliban was pressed by the United States to surrender bin Laden. When they declined, American preparations for the invasion began. The United States needed the airspace, bases, and logistical backing of nearby nations to carry out the invasion because Afghanistan is a landlocked nation. Though it was negotiating support with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the United States sorely needed Pakistan's help (Wasi, 2002). Beyond Iran, which was not seen as a useful ally, Pakistan was the only other nation that bordered both the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan. Ships in the Indian Ocean provided the majority of the fighter planes, personnel, and supplies. Pakistan's tense ties with the United States and its close ties with the Taliban meant that the Bush administration used coercive diplomacy to win Pakistan's assistance. Right away, the United States started assembling a global alliance. In less than a day, NATO used Article 5 for the first time in its history and the United States was granted a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force (Simma, 1999).

The United States needed Pakistan's assistance to launch the assault even with its sizable coalition. To stop bin Laden and other al Qaida and Taliban commanders from fleeing or sheltering, the United States sought to attack Afghanistan swiftly. As such, the United States sought Pakistani assistance right away. Numerous avenues were used for the formal diplomacy. Most of the talks with President Musharraf and the Pakistani administration were handled by Wendy Chamberlain, the American ambassador. The U.S. government mostly dealt with the Pakistani Embassy in Washington. Finally, a number of phone conversations between President Musharraf and President Bush or Secretary of State Colin Powell defined the negotiations. By all three of the aforementioned means, the United States made it plain to Pakistan that it required logistical help, use of Pakistan's airspace, and intelligence assistance.

Though the United States never officially threatened to use force, it did threaten to add Pakistan to a State Department list of seven countries that support terrorism, implying that force might be used. One senior diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad claimed that President Musharraf was instructed to either stop supporting the Taliban or get ready to be handled similarly to the Taliban. In Washington, the main players in the diplomacy were Pakistan Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi and his ISI chief Mahmoud Ahmed, as well as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Beginning on September 12 and continuing every day thereafter, Armitage provided the U.S. list of demands, which included Pakistan sealing its borders with Afghanistan, using its territory as a staging ground, and complete use of airspace. Embassy Chamberlain was making the same demands in Islamabad. Armitage, one source said, was direct, stating that the United States was assembling a coalition and that "clearly there was a worldwide momentum right now to stand up and be counted." Are you here with us or not?" When Secretary Powell called Musharraf on September 13, he asked for "a specific list of things we think would be useful for them to work on with us" (CNN, 2001).

The American pressure was effective, and on September 16 Pakistan declared that it would join the international coalition against terrorism and provided urgent concrete assistance, including military bases. The U.S. thus had Pakistan's backing in a few days, although it was unclear how committed Pakistan was. Understanding that a preliminary agreement had been achieved but that the specifics were still to be worked out, Musharraf tried to set himself up for future talks. In a speech to his country on September 19, Musharraf discussed "wrong decisions" made during the nation's crises (implied by declining to join the alliance against terrorism). In his talk, Musharraf listed four main concerns: defending Pakistan's stability and security against outside threats, reviving the economy, protecting its strategic nuclear and missile arsenal, and resolving the Kashmir issue. Pakistan, he said, is the first priority and everything else comes

second. Next day, during a joint session of Congress and the American people, President Bush made his well-known "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" speech. Musharraf responded with his appropriate remark. Pakistan was being warned informally by the US that failure to comply would result in the same punishments as terrorists. Since the specifics of the support were yet unknown, the goal of this public diplomacy was to guarantee Pakistan's cooperation would be sincere. Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act, together with the Pressler, Glenn, and Symington Amendments, placed economic and military restrictions on Pakistan. On September 22 these were raised. Bush used Brownback II authority to accord them all exemptions.

On September 24, a combined Task Force from the Departments of Defense and State negotiated with the Pakistani government on a wide range of agreements, therefore advancing the country's assistance for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (CNN, 2023). Pakistan committed to give vital petrol supplies, access to naval and aviation bases, and blanket flyover and landing rights. Pakistan's complete support was demonstrated when much of the logistical assistance was first offered without the usual formal agreements or user fees needed for such benefits.

The U.S. started Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7 and Kabul fell by November 12. The unqualified success of the joint invasion depended heavily on Pakistan's cooperation. Throughout the battle, Pakistan, according to Ambassador Chamberlain, offered "unstinting support." "Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists and committed more troops than any other nation in the Global Counterterrorism Force," remarked an officer of U.S. Central Command. Pakistan kept its word to provide military and intelligence assistance. From carriers in the Indian Ocean, nearly 28,000 missions overflew Pakistani airspace during the first five months of the war. Pakistan helped the United States construct up a number of facilities, including Intermediate Staging Bases in Shamsi,

Dalbandin, Jacobabad, and Pasni. Pakistan also gave the US permission to base Predators at Jacobabad and Shamsi and to access other bases used by the more than 50 aircraft and 2,000 coalition military personnel stationed there.

At first, Pakistan supplied aircraft with fuel, averaging 100,000 gallons per day, without any set repayment plan. Over 35,000 troops were sent by Pakistan to guard these coalition sites and to strengthen border security, which led to the purported detention of 420 valuable Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives. Pakistan finally gave coalition forces intelligence assistance, most particularly human intelligence, which the forces sorely needed to augment their technical intelligence. Furthermore keeping its word was the United States. Soon after sanctions were removed, the United States began to offer Pakistan military and economic assistance. Throughout the first three years, the United States paid off \$1 billion in debt, gave \$1.2 billion in arms sales, revived a military training program, and gave \$3 billion in economic and security help.

What Pakistan Means to the United States

For the US and its friends, Pakistan once more becomes a frontline state. The following, among other things, are the main reasons why the US granted Pakistan non-NATO ally status:

For its "War on Terror," the United States sorely needs Pakistan. Parts of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are sheltering in Pakistani tribal regions and Afghanistan (Nazir, 2021). To intercept and manage the operations of these components, the US need the assistance and services of Pakistani soldiers. The reported comparatively easy movement of terrorist groups across the Pakistan-Afghan border has long worried the US. It is progressively settling into a framework that will allow its soldiers to implement the hot pursuit strategy.

Afghanistan, in US opinion, is the cornerstone of its fight against terrorism. Its triumph there has great symbolic meaning everywhere. Its main NATO partners, who are involved here in

comparatively higher numbers than Iraq, share this view. The West as a whole finds Afghanistan to be quite important. The United States needs a firm hold over Afghanistan if it is to stay there for a long time. Being close to Afghanistan, Pakistan can assist the US in stabilizing that country (Akhtar, 2008).

Being encircled by Afghanistan, India, China, Iran, and Central Asia, Pakistan's geostrategic position is another crucial element (Omidi et al., 2021). The United States wants to strengthen the stability elements in Pakistan, which are vital to its ongoing struggle against terrorism in the region. Long-term strategic goals will also be served by it with regard to developing regional powers in Pakistan's vicinity.

These days, the United States completely offends against nuclear proliferation. The problem of nuclear leaks to neighboring nations has brought Pakistan to the forefront of attention lately. While the government of Pakistan categorically refuted the accusations, Dr. A.Q. Khan was held entirely responsible for what was alleged to have been done on an individual basis. The US will closely monitor Pakistan's nuclear program even though it has acknowledged Pakistan's position, to ensure that other countries—especially terrorists—do not obtain the technology.

The prospect that Al-Qaeda could obtain a dirty bomb worries the US greatly. It is crucial for its attempts to prevent the sale and use of such a device in the US or any other Western country to identify the likely users at their source and prevent the Al-Qaeda leadership from obtaining it from the underworld of Pakistan or former Soviet States. For that particular reason, US soldiers must engage with the Pakistan Army more.

The One nuclear flashpoint is now South Asia. United States is paying close attention to the area and making every effort to stop the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. The US is guiding India and Pakistan toward normalization piecemeal. It has to exert more influence with the

Indian and Pakistani armies as they are in charge of the nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan Being Non-NATO Ally of the U.S.

Pakistan was almost labelled a terrorist state just before the 9/11 tragedy. For Pakistan, this event that altered the course of world politics really proved to be a blessing. The lone superpower, the United States, turned to Pakistan and, following Soviet intervention in 1979, again made a U-turn. Otherwise, continents apart, Pakistan's response and support to the United States in its "War on Terror" further drew the two nations closer. Since then, there has been constant communication and cooperation between the Musharraf government and Washington, resulting in encouraging remarks and frequent visits by senior officials of both, with the goal of developing a long-term strategic partnership. Following his meeting with Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmud Kasuri, in Islamabad during his March 2004 visit to South Asia, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said at a joint press conference that he had brought a message from the American people and President Bush that the US seeks to have long-term relations with Pakistan as well as to further strengthen the ties of friendship (Ullah, 2021).

Realizing Pakistan's contribution to the fight against terrorism, the management of extremists, and the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation, he said that the US had granted Pakistan the status of a non-NATO ally. He said, "The United States considers Pakistan an important and major ally outside of NATO, which will lead to greater military cooperation between the two states." Since there had been no indication of such US plans before the press conference, Pakistan was taken aback by this announcement, which appeared to be made abruptly. This choice appeared to be made to applaud Pakistan for its efforts in the "War on Terror," particularly the ongoing Wana Operation by Pakistani forces to stop terrorists from hiding in Pakistan's tribal areas. Mr. Powell visited during a period when this operation was in full swing. Mr. Colin Powell said that the US government had notified Congress

that Pakistan will be recognized as a significant non-NATO partner. The US Congress's support of the US administration in June completed the legal process needed to designate Pakistan as a non-NATO ally.

Significance of the Special Status for Pakistan

Pakistan is now dealing with a softer, more accommodating, and encouraging US policy after the country reversed course in 2001. Pakistan is one of the main recipients of US aid, and in five years it will have received three billion dollars. The United States is also offering a one and a half billion-dollar program to relieve debt. Pakistan would also receive short- and long-term loans from the US export-import bank (Ex-Im) to buy US goods. Major non-NATO allies are exempt from suspension of US military aid, according to State Departments deputy spokesman Adam Ereli. One other benefit is that, although being outside of US military installations, their land contains US-owned military supply stores. Along with the chance to take part in particular US cooperative training agreements, they are qualified for expedited processing of commercial satellite export permits. Close military contact between the armed forces of the two nations is another advantage of the position. Over his tour, Colin Powell made clear that the US is open to working with other countries in areas other than the "War on Terror," such as the military, corporate, and educational sectors. "US aid provision is not mandatory and will depend on the approval of the US administration."

Consequences for Pakistan

Alliances are denounced by the Idealistic and Realistic schools of thought alike. Idealists emphasize a great deal the risks and drawbacks of forming alliances. But the Realists impose some requirements on coalitions to be advantageous. Top 10 An "alliance" is a conventional method of gaining support from another state or states. It is a commitment to assist under specific circumstances, typically against a designated mutual enemy. Whether the state enters a

hierarchical alliance, or one based on fair equality, or whether it is a weak or strong partner, all coalitions result in a certain loss of freedom of action. Pakistan will once more bear the American flag. Pakistan may benefit from this at the moment with the USA as the only superpower, but in the future when other centers of power develop, Pakistan will be associated with the United States. High expectations from both parties, which may not always be met because to their closeness, will cause feelings of disappointment. Being an unstable economy, Pakistan will get more accustomed to relying on outside sources than independence. "This status will be more advantageous to the US than Pakistan and appears to be more psychological than substantive." Twelve Pakistan was achieving their goals, which "were those of the donor (US), rather than in the interest of the recipient," even before it joined the military coalitions CENTO and SEATO. 2013 The status granted to Pakistan appears to be without any limitations or conditions requiring the United States to support Pakistan during a war. Another consideration is that "the major non-NATO ally status does not allow the country so designated to enjoy the same mutual defence and security guarantees as are given to members of the NATO."

Conclusion

The US has gained new dimensions with Pakistan's status grant. It will have to go beyond Iraq and Afghanistan if the US and Pakistan are to have a long-term strategic relationship. Pakistan needs more arial support from America to meet the balance of power in the region. The US government intends to use this matter as a carrot to get Pakistan to meet its demands. The actual security threat to Pakistan comes from India, but being a significant non-NATO ally will not shield it from it. Senior US researcher and former US diplomat Dennis Kux feels that the status falls short of "the old Pakistan desire for security guarantee against India." How far Pakistan goes in meeting US expectations will undoubtedly determine what it gets out of becoming a significant non-NATO partner. It appears that any

military support Pakistan receives would come in smaller chunks, each linked to meeting a US demand. The relationship between Pakistan and the United States appears to change with the seasons and circumstances. The interests and preferences of the lone Super Power will determine how far and how long this important non-NATO ally status will remain. Though both the US and Pakistani governments emphasize that they both want to establish long-term strategic ties at this time, the US also wants to establish long-term strategic ties with India, which the US believes will be more stable and attractive than Pakistan. Depending on how far both sides will agree to go, the United States will provide give and take in terms of privileges and aid. Right now, it appears to be a lure to increase Pakistan Army engagement in activities inside and outside of Pakistan. This status appears to be transient in order to maintain Pakistan interested. It takes a meaningful friendship for a longer lasting association.

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