



A Revolutionist Analysis of The Thirty-Year Authoritarian Rule of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt

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Abstract: This study aims to analyze the Egyptian revolution and the subsequent overthrow of the long-standing authoritarian leader, Hosni Mubarak. The text emphasizes the youth of Egypt's part in changing the dictatorship to establish democracy in the country. This paper emphasizes the reasons that motivated the Egyptians to leave their homes and overthrow Hosni Mubarak. The investigation also includes the excessive use of authority by state officials to suppress protests. This research also examines the involvement of the military and other law enforcement agencies during the revolution. The text delves into the utilization of social media during the protests and its role in disseminating information about the events. This document briefly discusses the previous authoritarian leaders of Egypt, including Hosni Mubarak. The text also delves into the strategies employed by authoritarian regimes to extend their reigns.

Introduction

Egypt's enduring autocratic rulers maintained control over the population until January 25, 2011, when Egyptians initiated protests inspired by the actions of Tunisians (AHMAD, 2020). Youth Citizens in a nation that endorsed liberty were informed about the necessity for transformation using social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Maringira, 2022). Extensive demonstrations were scheduled for Friday, January 28. The purpose of these was to assess the authority and power of the government. The government instructed individuals to barricade city centers, squares, bridges, and other gathering spots. The authorities also terminated access to the Internet, social media platforms, and cell phone services. The government's many attempts were unsuccessful. A large crowd breached the boundaries in Cairo and gathered at Tahrir Square, located in front of the Presidential Palace and the state TV center (Aljazeera, 2011).

President Hosni Mubarak dismissed his government and instructed the army to handle the protesters as the police withdrew. The army intervened on February 11 during the escalating rebellion and compelled President Hosni Mubarak to resign. Dictatorships often use authority to suppress opposition groups (Alzazeera, 2011). The military appears poised to employ this type of control. The country's elite probably utilize the military as the most effective method to maintain their power. Many authoritarian regimes have maintained power only via the use of military force. Many military dictatorships replaced democratic or dictatorial leaders after their removal. People live under dictatorships due to their oppressive nature, leading to the military serving its own interests rather than those of the ruling class. The individuals who essentially governed Egypt were either civilian or military dictators.

Following the coup in 1952, General Muhammad Nagib established Egypt as a republic and assumed the role of its inaugural president (Faksh, 1976). Shortly thereafter, Gamal Abdel Nasser compelled him to resign from his employment and placed him under house arrest. From 1956 to 1970, Gamal Abdel Nasser governed South Africa. Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency of Egypt following the death of the previous president in 1970 and remained in office until 1981 (Cook, 2011). An Islamic extremist assassinated Anwar Sadat in October 1981 (Ansari, 1984). Hosni Mubarak became president through an uncontested election. President Hosni Mubarak employed various strategies to prolong his tenure in office. He attempted to hold elections, but the citizens were not truly afforded the opportunity to select their leader. To maintain his authority, he had to seek assistance from police enforcement and utilize their formidable powers to silence anybody who opposed him. Egypt had become accustomed to being under a perpetual state of emergency. The interior minister was granted excessive authority to restrict the fundamental human rights of Egyptians. The public turned against the government as a result. When demonstrators ousted Tunisian President Zein El Abidin bin Ali, it served as a model for Egyptians, who followed suit. Following the successful uprising in Tunisia, opposition leaders coordinated nationwide protests to coincide with January 25th, known as "National Police Day" (Clarke, 2014). The youth in the nation, who advocated for freedom, utilized social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to promote positive change. According to Egyptian law, protests were deemed unlawful unless authorized by the government.

The demonstrators organized small gatherings in several locations, particularly near mosques in Cairo, to prevent conflicts with the police. All of them were expected to gather in Tahrir Square. They started the march from several locations towards their ultimate destination, Tahrir Square. Hundreds of

individuals, including men, women, and children, participated in the march, which rapidly increased in size over time. It seems that individuals no longer harbored apprehension about an authoritarian regime. Extensive demonstrations were scheduled for Friday, January 28. The purpose of these was to assess the authority and power of the government. The government instructed individuals to barricade city centers, squares, bridges, and other gathering spots. The authorities also disconnected the Internet, social media, and cell phone service. The government's many attempts were unsuccessful. A large crowd in Cairo breached the gates to reach Tahrir Square to demonstrate against the tyrannical regime. Many individuals participated, although there was a lack of distinct leadership. The government swiftly implemented a curfew; however, the majority of individuals did not adhere to it. President Hosni Mubarak dismissed his government and instructed the army to handle the protesters as the police withdrew (Kirkpatrick, 2011). The protesters dismantled any symbols of oppression, such as police stations across. They were accused because of suspicions that foreign espionage organizations were supporting them financially. Protesters and reporters, both domestic and international, were perceived as foreign spies. They were under attack by regime supporters. The Egyptian administration stated that criticism of the crackdowns by other countries was viewed as interference in Egypt's internal affairs. Omar Suleiman, the newly appointed vice president of Egypt, stated that foreign interference in Egypt's domestic matters will not be tolerated. The government instructed internet service providers to disconnect foreign links on the night of January 27th. Egyptians lost internet connectivity due to this. The government instructed cell phone carriers to cease operations in specific locations on January 28. The administration utilized all of Egypt's cellular networks to disseminate messages to the populace in favor of the regime. The government's many attempts were

unsuccessful. Protesters controlled central Cairo in opposition to the government. Tahrir Square once again served as a site for people to gather, recall, protest, sing, strategize, and discuss current events. Approximately 300,000 workers were believed to have gone on strike on February 9. The leaders of these strikes reached Tahrir Square, located in front of the Presidential Palace and the state TV center. The army intervened on February 11 during the escalating rebellion and compelled President Hosni Mubarak to resign.

The Egyptians emerged victorious, but the victory came at a high price. Several of them experienced the loss of family members. Approximately 840 individuals perished, and another 6,000 had injuries (CNN, 2012). Removing President Hosni Mubarak incurred significant expenses. The Ministry of Health received preliminary data from affiliated institutions indicating that 384 individuals died and 6467 were injured during the rebellion. The Ministry of Health reported that 846 individuals had died in hospitals under the management of the police, military, and private individuals by April 4. However, human rights activists and others believe that the actual number of casualties was greater than the figure reported by the ministry. Various human rights organizations released lists of individuals who had been murdered. Each group's facts are distinct from the others.

The Objective of the Research

The research will examine the political, social, and economic influences that impacted Mubarak's administration, including analyzing the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and its origins and consequences. The study examines power structures, resistance groups, and potential changes in the battle against authoritarianism from a revolutionary perspective.

Significance of the Research

The paper is essential for shedding light on the complex socio-political processes of Mubarak's

tenure and the transformative impacts of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. The study examines Mubarak's authoritarian regime from a revolutionary standpoint to improve our understanding of power structures, resistance movements, and the potential for societal change in autocratic settings. The article offers crucial insights into how public movements confront authoritarian regimes and shape the course of history in Egypt and other regions.

Literature Review

The fact that the question has sparked considerable interest and disagreement across a wide variety of academic fields is one of the most notable characteristics of the revolution literature. The aspects explained below have been covered by this study. A pattern of research that focuses on the potential outcomes of revolutions. As a result of the expansion of globalization, which represents the pinnacle of capitalism, the first group came to the conclusion that the revolution would not come to an end in the foreseeable future. This is because the gap between the North and the South will also expand. The future of revolution is influenced by two primary topics that are connected to globalization: poverty and the role of the state (Roy, 1997). Even though capitalism was experiencing a global crisis in the 1990s, the other group believed that revolutions would eventually come to an end since the circumstances that led to revolutions were decreasing. Regarding the Egyptian revolution that took place on January 25, 2011, there was yet another trend of inquiry (Abdelmottlep, 2015).

In spite of the fact that it took a somewhat conservative approach, it utilized the system theory in order to investigate the internal economic and political elements that contributed to the revolution. The political economics approach was utilized in other research, which provided a preview of Mubarak's economic policy as a prerequisite for the revolution. Additionally, there are additional studies that have

concentrated on the role that a certain social class had in the revolution. Another research, on the other hand, focused on the changes that occurred to the urban middle class in relation to the function that the state played in the time before the revolution. The final trend of research examined the Occupy movement as an anti-systemic movement, taking into consideration its relationship to other anti-systemic movements as well as the crisis that the world system is currently experiencing. The Egyptian Revolution was founded with the intention of gaining democracy, social growth, and national independence. The study also linked revolution to changes in the global system. On the other hand, these findings are redundant to the conclusions that Samir Amin previously reached. Wallerstein was criticized in the study for listing environmentalists and human rights organizations as examples of structural movements that are against the system. Nevertheless, Wallerstein emphasized the significance of human rights organizations and environmentalists despite the fact that he is somewhat less anti-systemic in today's world. The study did not provide an answer to the primary research question, which was, according to Demir, to determine if the Egyptian revolution was a struggle against the system or a struggle within the system. This study aims to fill a vacuum in the existing body of literature by applying Wallerstein's idea of anti-systemic movements to the Egyptian revolution that occurred on January 25. Additionally, this study strives to eliminate the shortcomings that were present in Demir's study. When it comes to analyzing the Egyptian revolution, Wallerstein's analysis is rarely utilized, despite the fact that it is an important holistic approach that integrates both internal and external elements, which ultimately leads to major consequences.

Why Egypt's Revolution Occurred

An increasing number of causes, including but not limited to increased poverty and inequality, high unemployment, widespread corruption,

police brutality, a lack of political and civil rights, and an ongoing state of emergency, were the primary motivating elements behind the Egyptian Revolution.

Poverty

The Egyptian economy made progress in the 1980s, but the capital wasn't spread out fairly (Mohamed Kamal et al., [2023](#)). The poverty line for the whole world is set at two US dollars a day or less. Over 32 million Egyptians lived close to or below the poverty line in 2009 (Ibrahim, [2011](#)). A lot of Egyptians needed bread and cooking oil that the government gave them to stay alive. A lot of extra benefits were taken away from workers in state-owned businesses when the government started a plan to privatize several agencies. Most people's wages were much smaller because prices were going up.

Corruption

Poverty, unemployment, and corruption were prominent issues in Egyptian society. The governing class held exclusive control over wealth, and it was the minority, not the masses, that reaped the benefits of the open economy. Corruption, including bribes, can be differentiated from various transactions, especially those involving government departments, regardless of their scale. While the government ceased granting subsidies on food grains to address the national debt, individuals connected to President Hosni Mubarak, including family members and close associates, embezzled billions of dollars from their global bank accounts. Historically, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was a major political party consisting of influential businessmen from various regions of the country (Heiss, [2012](#)). Their domination in the industries led to the accumulation of one billion dollars. In 2010, Egypt was placed 98th out of 178 countries with a score of 3.1 on the corruption index issued by Transparency International.

Joblessness

As a result of a significant number of young people, including graduates, joining the workforce, the rate of unemployment was steadily climbing. There were more young individuals with higher levels of education than there were jobs available. The food crisis that occurred in 2008 and resulted in increased prices had a huge impact on Egyptians who were living in poverty (Cohen et al., [2011](#)). This is because a significant percentage of their income is spent on purchasing food. Egyptians were forced to live in huge informal settlements that were frequently dangerous since there was a shortage of cheap housing. This was a significant challenge for the Egyptian people. According to official figures from 2008, there were over 12.2 million people living in informal settlements in Egypt, with over half of them being located in Greater Cairo.

A State of Emergency that Never Ends, Police Brutality and Violations of Human Rights

The 25th of January Revolutions started as a protest against the severe treatment by police personnel (Marzouk, [2021](#)). Although the government designated it as Egypt's Police Day, the citizens of Egypt viewed it as an opportunity to demonstrate. Emergency laws granted the Interior Ministry of Egypt extensive authority. The Ministry in question mistreated the people mainly through the Omnipresent State Security Investigation and the Central Security Forces, which consist of around 325,000 police officers. In Egypt, emergency and other restricted laws granted the police full authority to detain and imprison anyone without requiring prior approval from the court. The legislation granted security forces the authority to disregard individuals' constitutional rights, establish special and military courts, restrict the political activities of the opposition, and manage rallies. Law enforcement and security personnel severely violated people's rights during the implementation of emergency regulations. The legislation established a parallel judicial system, operating outside the official court system and

compromising the safety of individuals beyond the boundaries specified by Egyptian law (MOUSTAFA, [2003](#)).

For years, the Interior Ministry utilized emergency powers to detain hundreds of thousands of individuals in jail without charges or trial. They did this despite many court orders to release them. The extensive implementation of administrative confinement had a broad impact on society and significantly increased the challenges faced by Egyptians in several aspects of life. The regulations primarily targeted lawmakers opposed to the government, human rights activists, religious minority members, journalists, and bloggers. In his 2005 election campaign, Hosni Mubarak promised to terminate the state of emergency. The administration pledged to uphold this commitment contingent on the enactment of a new anti-terrorism law following Mubarak's triumph. That year, the government prolonged the state of emergency for a further two years. In March 2007, a "referendum" took place to amend Article 179 of the Egyptian Constitution and incorporate the new anti-terrorism law. The security forces can now arrest and detain individuals without their consent to combat terrorism, as the Constitution no longer restricts them. Security forces were granted the authority to conduct searches in people's residences without search warrants and to eavesdrop on individuals' phone conversations. The Egyptian president was granted the authority to transfer any matter to a court of his choosing, bypassing the standard judicial process.

In May 2010, the Emergency Law was renewed by presidential order with a focus on combating terrorism and drug trafficking. Articles 3(1) and 3(5) explicitly stated that they would only be utilized. Article 3(1) granted security personnel the authority to detain individuals for an extended period for administrative purposes. This article granted the government the authority to restrict individuals' freedom to assemble, associate, travel, or reside

as they wished. It also granted them the authority to detain anyone deemed suspicious or potentially dangerous to public safety and delegate these responsibilities to others. The government could easily do all of this by a straightforward verbal or written directive. People were already incensed by the police's mistreatment and lack of justice in these incidents. Khalid Mohammed Said, a 28-year-old man from Alexandria, was killed on June 6, 2010, leading to increased freedom of speech, according to Amnesty International's report in 2011. In Alexandria and Cairo, individuals demonstrated in public areas to demand justice for Shehata, referred to as "the martyr of the state of emergency," in 2012. The event was beneficial for individuals who oppose dictatorships, and the movement they initiated was named *"We Are All Khalid Said."*

Ongoing Call for Democracy and Transformation

The demand for change did not occur abruptly but rather evolved gradually throughout time. The country has been experiencing prolonged upheaval. Each public outcry penetrated the dense curtain of authoritarianism, yet the regime responded with brutality. During that period, there was an increase in political opposition within the nation. The protests that started in 2002 aimed to promote peace between Iraqis and Palestinians, stop police violence, and amend the constitution (Arens et al., [2012](#)). In 2002, a significant protest took place in Egypt to demonstrate solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada. That year, a large number of Egyptians demonstrated against the US-led war in Iraq at Tahrir Square in Cairo. Opposition groups united to organize nationwide rallies against Hosni Mubarak's reelection campaign.

Cairo was the epicenter of Egypt's significant protests for political reforms and the termination of the state of emergency in 2006 and 2007. The participants in the protests were apprehended, restrained, struck, and subjected to mistreatment by law enforcement. Both the public and judges were irritated by the manipulation in the 2006

election and the assault on the court. Many individuals demonstrated in favor of the police. Approximately 25,000 textile mill workers went on strike in the same year to demand a pay rise. The strike was successful, prompting more workers and employees at different schools to follow suit. In October 2007, the workers at the El-Mahalla textile plant seized control in order to receive the promised bonus.

On April 6, 2008, workers at El-Mahalla initiated a statewide strike to express their frustration over Egypt's lack of political and economic advancement. Individuals from many regions across the nation answered their requests. The Interior Ministry of Egypt instructed individuals not to participate in protests, leading some to remain at home. Protest participants were arrested and faced charges. In 2008, an emergency court sentenced twenty-two individuals for participating in violent protests in El Mahalla. The 25 January Revolution was founded upon these strikes and protests. In 2009, demonstrators once again marched in the streets to demand reforms in the nation's governance and economy. Several demonstrators were apprehended and prosecuted. Egypt's political opposition parties gained prominence as the number of protests increased and people became less afraid. The Muslim Brotherhood attracted over 500,000 members, establishing itself as the largest political opposition organization. Despite being prohibited, this political group, along with others, gained more influence in the public sphere due to a well-established network of charities and organizations. Despite being prohibited, it still appeared in certain polls and garnered significant backing. Many new members joined the communist and secular liberal groups.

Conclusion

It is to be concluded that The Thirty-Year Authoritarian Rule of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt provides a comprehensive analysis of the political, social, and economic influences that defined Mubarak's regime and the

transformative impact of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. The study demonstrates the vulnerability of authoritarian governments by analyzing power structures and resistance movements, highlighting how popular uprisings can effectively challenge entrenched tyranny. The study demonstrates the significance of grassroots activity and collective action in altering the trajectory of nations and promoting democracy and social justice. The study provides valuable insights into the complexity of political transition and the ongoing struggle for freedom and human rights. Egypt is still adapting to life post-revolution.

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