

An Assessment of Counter Insurgency Strategy Against TTP in Tribal Belt

Aamir Khan ^a

Abstract: Pakistan's tribal belt is facing a renewed wave of insurgency with changes in tactics and approaches from TTP. The overall strategic and security environment in the tribal belt is becoming a no-go area again. The challenges are complex. Ranging from past security vacuums to the structural flaws in governance and denial of winning public trust in pre- and post-insurgency scenarios. The resurgence of TTP is a complex phenomenon as a result of complex variables, both internal and external. The leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud played an important role in re-organizing and restructuring TTP in the tribal belt and KP. This issue and counterinsurgency strategy were badly ignored in the tribal belt. The consequences are now in front of state and security forces in Pakistan. Therefore, this paper aims to critically analyze Pakistan's counter-insurgency strategies in the post-military actions in the tribal belt and will look at major policy errors and loopholes in this regard.

Keywords: Counter-Insurgency, Flawed Approach, Governance, Resurgence, Post-Military Operations, Local Grievances, Security Failure

Introduction

The issue and threat of insurgency in Pakistan's tribal belt are alarming and complex. The threat and re-rise of TTP and other splinter groups under one umbrella is not sudden but traced back to the existing societal, economic, political, and geographical factors. The structural and post-military campaigns complicate the issue for security forces and political administration. The state missed the effective and long-term policy-oriented approach in the tribal belt. The major attribute and variable in the resurgence of TTP is the political vacuum. The tribal belt represents an area of aliens in a political context. There is a lack of political and administrative research in major parts.

The initial kinetic approaches were successful. The security forces targeted the high-value leadership of TTP and various groups across the tribal belt and Afghanistan. The TTP fighters were neutralized in various intelligence-based operations. Initially, the TTP organizational command and chain were broken down with successful kinetic operations. Strict measures and cross-border infiltration were minimized. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border brought temporary peace as security forces established various checkpoints and surveillance mechanisms. The capacity of armed forces was high against the continued insurgency in the tribal belt. However, the post-military success and kinetic approaches were misshaped due to less emphasis on non-kinetic measures. Initially, the merger of FATA was a step in this direction. However, the democratic, local police and CTD were not fully extended and empowered in FATA. The actualization of institutions and capacity building remains a dream in the majority of the tribal belt. The police and CTD were not extended, nor were they empowered to compete with insurgents.

The Perception of the Terror Enclave Community in the Population

From the Cold War era to the post-9/11 and war on terror policies, the indigenous population in ex-FATA see themselves as subject to broader regional and global strategic games. The strategic games, in this sense, mean that the local population and geography were used as a breeding ground for terrorism, Jihad and a hub of constructed militancy. Once served as an additional buffer zone in the Great Game between the British and Tsarist empires. The second part of the development started during the Cold War era and

^a Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Qurtuba University of Science and Information Technology, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.

the subsequent development after the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The ex-FATA and its geographical proximity were used for training the Afghan Mujahedeen under the will and policy of the state. The US policy and game of containing the USSR was played on the soil of Fata.

The significant event of the 21st century and the start of the War on Terror since 9/11, 2001, marked another major development. Throughout this decade up to 2021, the geography of FATA was used as a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorism. Numerous military operations and counterinsurgency campaigns and doctrines were applied during this era. Peace and stability for the local population remain a distant dream. The policy and shift from the government initiated in the shape of the FATA merger. Initially, it was appreciated by the majority of the population with the hope of integration into the state or province and the end of the dual policy against the locale. However, the dramatic scenario developed after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the emergence of the Taliban 2. The emerging discourse about the past and possible military operations is significant and can't be overlooked. There are widespread sentiments in the masses against military operations. The wounds and suffering of past military operations are still in the tribal belt.

This development brought significant security challenges after the post-merger scenario. The elements of TTP and various factions regain their confidence, and once again, the people of ex-FATA are put into the new great game of militancy. As mentioned above, the peace deal and settlement of the TTP's elements in FATA was a major strategic and security blunder. The state and security apparatus put blank eyes on the regrouping of the insurgents. These groups emerged as catalysts for peace and the local population. This raised serious questions in the local population regarding the will and intent of the government and security forces regarding peace and security in ex-FATA. In short, once again, the ex-FATA became the centre of proxy politics and border games between regional and global powers.

In the most recent years, significant resistance and movements have been strategized against the dual policy of the state in the shape of re-imposed terror. From Swat to North and South Waziristan, the young and informed leaders emerged and raised their serious voices against the imposed terror. There is a wider perception in the entire tribal belt that the game of terror is again initiated by the state. The new council and leaders are well aware of the security policies and lapses. The population remains clear and poses significant resistance to the imposed militancy. The will and support for the government and security forces are becoming minimal. The entire generation of the local population is rising up, witnessing the militancy and insurgency. The sense of dis-belonging is prevailing, and the young are questioning the state and its security policies. The broader assessment is that the young population is well-informed and aware, and they question the entire game and policies.

Methodology

This paper utilized a qualitative cum-analytical methodological approach, keeping in view the nature of the study. Qualitative methodology gives sense-making and a wider perspective and assessment of a situation, phenomenon, and any specific issue. The purpose is to assess the counterinsurgency doctrines and analyze and reach the major policy discussion. This study relied on secondary sources of data as the issue of the resurgence of TTP in the tribal belt is widely covered by mainstream print and electronic media in Pakistan. The issue is also subject to major academic scholarship and research. Therefore, in this paper, the available data will be thoroughly analyzed, and major security and counterinsurgency strategy failures against TTP will be found. Moreover, this paper has applied thematic data analysis and techniques for data assessment.

Assessing Post-Operations Scenarios

It is a well-known phenomenon that post-insurgency scenarios need proper strategy after military defeat of insurgency. The state and security forces, although expelled major portions of insurgent groups from the tribal belt. But the structural factors played an important role in their resurgence. The fact is that the government missed the major principles of COIN, particularly in post-insurgency scenarios. Here are various variables that can be put as major sources of the resurgence of terrorist groups.

Poor Governance

The tribal belt represents one of the major denial areas in modern history. Politically, they were alienated from the rest of the province and state. As pointed out by O'Neill (2002), a lack of political legitimacy and control over governance and poor administrative reach provides opportunities for insurgent groups to exploit these flanks. The governance, administrative, and political spaces provide sets of areas on which insurgents propagate their agendas and dishearten masses from the political setup. The state's and institutions' legitimacy increases, and the masses trust them if they ensure political, social, judicial, and economic facilitations and services to the locals (Beckett, 2001). However, as earlier stated, the tribal belt missed these facilities and was alienated from the political processes and simply marginalized. The colonial legacy and system of governance as practised in the tribal belt were also the major sources of concern and policy failure on the government side. In fact, the weak system of governance and state faces a serious threat to human development and progress and unintentionally leads to the resurgence of militancy. These are all factors that have a correlation with the resurgence of terrorism in the tribal belt.

Spirit and Sense of FATA Merger

The state's and government's reach and control over a particular territory and population are considered a prime step for political legitimacy. Indeed, it is also a feature of good governance in modern times. Government legitimacy, political and security administrative reach, and prerequisites of good governance (Collins, 2011). On the same note, if the government provides effective governance, redresses the grievances of the public, and provides equal social services to the masses, then the legitimacy of the government would definitely increase. Further, in this context, O'Neill (2002) noted that weak and poor governance structure and reach of government lead to a lack of human development and overall devaluation of social, political, and economic standards and conditions, which is directly correlated with terrorism.

In the overall picture of pre- and post-merger FATA, the situation represents a very grim picture. According to O'Neill (2002), terrorists and insurgents seek support from deprived sections of the population. These deprivations include economic, political, and social humiliation of sections of the population, vulnerable communities and marginalized sections. Indeed, terrorism and insurgency are products of bad governance, societal radicalization, widespread corruption, and, most importantly, human rights violations (Nagal, 2006). All these factors, one way or the other, contribute to the rise of terrorism and insurgency in any state and society. These are the governance-related and structural issues that contribute to the rise of terrorism and insurgents. These variables and attributes serve as recruiting causes for terrorists and insurgents.

Importantly, the government also failed to assess the growing fictions and perceptions of the merger between youths and elders. In fact, the prominent elders support the previous status of FATA, while the youth bulk actively favours mergers and reforms. This contrast and generation gap further complicate the merger process. Similarly, the elders and the former government's indirect representatives fear the loss of their perks and privileges, while the perceptions among youth are different, and they want to see political reforms and active political participation. From these two sections, there is an acute trust deficit in the official procedure and reforms from the government side. In fact, the political system has yet to be actively introduced in the tribal belt while dealing with significant trust and mistrust from the local population. This needs to be properly addressed and assessed in order to reach the proper implementation of reforms. Even today, the political and administrative setup in majority tribal areas represents former status, and there is little progress on the political reforms and agenda.

The new extended administrative system did not deliver as expected. The major reason was the pre-merger mentality in the government offices and the prevailing security situation across the tribal belt. Even the newly posted officials in the merged districts refused to join the allocated departments due to security reasons and threats. The government institutions and setups resemble the ghost houses in many districts, as reported by Bukhari (2022, July 18); the pre-merger system, as compared to the post-merger system, is not delivering. There are various reasons, including financial resources, hard areas, persisting local conflicts, minimal presence of the judicial system, and poor infrastructure. These are all part of this process. However, one should personally witness the situation of prevailing law and order.

There is uncertainty over the law-and-order situation. According to the author's personal communication with the newly transferred officers, including health, education, and judicial departments, they raised their fears, citing the unpredictable security situation and lack of guarantee of their lives. "How should I be in touch with my family when there is no internet, transport is minimal, and there are constant security threats to the government officers?" (Personnel Communications, 2025). These factors show that the efforts from the government in the post-merger scenario are still needed, and the true realization of integration will take time, dependent on the above-mentioned factors.

Winning Hearts and Minds: Popular Support and Governance

In the context of rebellion and insurgency, the core issue remains at the heart of efforts from the government side through the centuries. However, the insurgency and counter-insurgency are the well-defined phenomena of the 20th century. In a broader context, defeating the insurgents and insurgency is called counter-insurgency. Further, the counter-insurgency initially was largely based on coercion, repression, annihilation, intimidation, and fear. However, the changing nature and pattern of insurgency and counter-insurgency also lead to complex approaches that can be termed neither rare nor common (Galula, 2006). The academic insights on counter-insurgency have modified, evolved, and changed over time. These academic insights covered insurgency and counter-insurgency from historical, political, social, military, and economic aspects.

The subject and scholarship on counterinsurgency are vast and changing. This scholarship includes historians, socio-anthropologists, political scientists, and military experts. There are various principles on the successful counterinsurgency strategies in the available literature.

All the above approaches, explanations, and principles would centre upon a single theme: that success and failure in counter-insurgency are based on political aspects. Simply put, it means that military force in counter-insurgency is not as effective as in conventional war. The real contest and sources of counterinsurgency must be the local population and their sympathies. The government and states should gain and develop sympathies and nullify the insurgent's ideology and tactics. As famously observed by the then Mao Tse Tung, insurgents and the population operate in similar situations, like fish and water. However, in the case of ex-FATA and the tribal belt, minimal public support is there for insurgents, and the local population is in a dilemma: if they support the government, the insurgents will target them, and if they do so in favour of the insurgents, the government and security forces will target them. "We have been put into the complex situation where support for the government leads to target killing." There seems to be no way out for us (Personnel Communication, 2025).

However, the ground situation and public support are different in ex-FATA and the tribal belt. There is a sense of perception that there is imposed insurgency on the people. According to a respondent of North Waziristan, "We are stuck between good and bad Taliban "insurgents." Accordingly, another local respondent mentioned that "the local sympathizers are few, not in the majority from the local population, and who will put their family and business on the verge of risk by joining or supporting insurgents and becoming their sympathizers?"

For any counterinsurgency operation and effort, it becomes clear that there are some broad parameters on which the overall strategy should focus. This includes gaining sympathy from the local population and civilians by adopting a civilian-centric approach and strategy. The loyalty and trust of the population are mandatory in order to win hearts and minds. This assertion of winning hearts and minds is based on complex phenomena of socio-economic, political, and military objectives. The other important variable includes logistics, clear and effective strategy, intelligence, and the deployment of forces and capacity building of local forces (Mockaitis, 2003) as the previously mentioned aspects are an important part of any effective strategy and counterinsurgency (Joes, 2004). By opting for this strategy and counterinsurgency, then one can find the center of gravity by dismantling the insurgents. In fact, Clausewitz's strategy (2003) is finding a pearl of great value or what German strategists argued was the point of the main effort (Schwerpunkt) (Vego, 2007).

The resurgence of TTP is easy to feel in the shape of mounting violence and attacks on security forces; however, it is also difficult to analyze the key factors ranging from structural to personal; they need further explanation. There is a different explanation available for the resurgence of TTP or any other terrorist organizations. Various scholars mentioned structural factors and government flaws that result in the durability of terrorist organizations. Indeed, the structural factors serve as spaces for terrorist organizations to regroup and flourish. Therefore, the underlined parts explain these structural factors by revealing their influence and role in the resurgence of militancy and TTP in ex-FATA and the tribal belt. The broader account is that the old structure of ex-FATA and the tribal belt is unchanged, and the proximity of the border with Afghanistan, governance factors, and societal aspects are leading factors for the resurgence of TTP.

The Resurgence of TTP

Situating Broader Structural Factors

This part is focused on how the regional structural factors contributed to the resurgence of TTP after the Taliban's capture of power in Afghanistan. Since August 2021, the control of the Taliban has given hope and ideological blessings to the TTP's militants in ex-Fata. Speaking broadly, the state failed to address and overcome the TTP dilemma in the ex-FATA. The start of negotiations with the TTP through the good Taliban, namely the Haqqani network, and the visit of prominent religious scholars from Pakistan lead to the weakness of the state. Although negotiations are the way out, when a state negotiates with a group of a few thousand, it is perceived as a strategic weakness by the other party. Notably, the entire state and security apparatuses were at the mercy of TTP's demands. The negotiators returned with failure and did not broker any peace deal with the TTP through the Afghan Taliban. From this point, the TTP started growing its confidence and organizational capabilities and extended and regrouped its militants (Khan, 2022). The new challenges and offences from the TTP were formulated and operationally initiated. The recent terror wave is part of the previously mentioned policy and weakness of the state.

Moreover, the start and policy shift in dealing with the TTP elements turned significant as the government decided to bring back the militants of the TTP from Afghanistan. The state media, although remaining silent on this news and policy. However, the rigorous and bold initiatives from TTP exposed the state policy. The TTP elements were shifted across the border in ex-FATA. The region becomes again an enclave of terror. From the policy perspective to the security lapses, this policy reconfirmed the old infamous mantra of good Taliban. The space and time were given to TTP. In fact, giving space and time means surrendering a state write and following strategic ambiguity over the insurgency.

Socio-Governance Aspects

The socio-governance aspects and factors remain poor and unaddressed in the post-merger scenarios. The integration of Fata into KP and the extension of administrative and political reach remain unachieved. The progress and extension of formal political institutions remain slow. The socio-political grievances of the people date back to the colonial era (FCR). The socio-political marginalization remains evident across the FATA. Even after the merger, the ground situation was difficult, and it represented the legacies of colonial rule. The administrative reach and control of state and provincial governments are not seen effectively. The distrust of the local population is at an all-time high among the central and provincial governments.

Since long, the socio-economic and political indicators in ex-FATA remain underdeveloped despite immense potentials. The old administrative structure, the poor governance structure, and rampant corruption remain the core issue in pre-merger FATA. The situation in ex-FATA was further aggravated by the decade-long insurgency and constant turmoil. The region can be argued to be poverty-stricken and to have nominal investment and development in socio-political, economic, health, education, and jobs markets.

The major development surfaced as the state decided to merge FATA and extend the legal and political system. The initial perception was to mainstream the FATA and bring it into the legal and political structure of the country. Under these perceptions and policy directives, the state merged FATA into KP on 28 May 2018 (Dawn, 2018). After the merger, the government extended the judicial system in 2018. However, the

introduction of the most controversial legal framework, the FATA Interim Governance Regulations, was to be the legal framework for the initial transition period. However, the Peshawar High Court, on legal grounds, declared that this legal framework was a violation of the constitution (Khan, [2019](#)). On a similar path and verdict, the Supreme Court of Pakistan also retreated the Peshawar High Court decision that the people of ex-Fata should be treated according to the law of the land. The Supreme Court of Pakistan also directed the government to make necessary structural arguments to extend the country's legal system in the newly merged areas. However, the pace and progress are still distant.

TTP's Organizational and Leadership Strategies

It is important to mention the structural factors that serve as breeding grounds for terrorist growth and organizations. The revitalization of terrorist groups is due to the volatile situation across the border in Afghanistan and the internal aspects suitable for insurgents (Syed, [2025](#)). The main reason was the post-military check and monitoring of terrorist elements and organizations (Freeman, [2014](#)). The security forces and government, however, did not maintain proper security and intelligence checks after major military operations. However, despite the above factors, the TTP's organizational capabilities and leadership played an important role in the resurgence. The TTP's leadership and organizational restructure also contributed to their rise. The TTP aligned itself with various splinter groups and the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud.

The victory of the Afghan Taliban and the resultant negotiations of Pakistan with the handful of insurgents give them the morale to fight for their case and break further to further strengthen their operational and organizational abilities. The reach and presence are now felt throughout the tribal belt and KP.

The Persona of Noor Wali Mehsud and Revival of TTP

As mentioned by Steinberg ([2004](#)), the leadership of any terrorist or insurgent organization plays an important role. He further mentioned that they serve as magnets of recruitment, advise operational and ideological strategies, create environments for recruitment, mobilize offensives, and frame the overall objectives of any insurgent movement. As a model of modern military command, the insurgent's leaders perform and serve two basic purposes, including inspiring the organization's members and devising operational guidance and strategy (Freeman, [2014](#)). The cause and appeal for recruitment are filled by leadership. The charismatic short of personality compels their followers to sacrifice their individual lives for the greater or personal cause. The ideological considerations are formed by the group's leader and serve as an intellectual framework for both the leader and their fighters. Similarly, the group's organizational achievements, goals, vision, and external connections with other states play an important role (Bryman, [1996](#)). Keeping in view the above role of leadership in the insurgent movement, the following discussion is intended to focus on Noor Wali Mehsud and his role in the re-rise and revival of TTP (Jadoon & Sayed, [2021](#)).

In June 2018, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud became the new leader of TTP after the death of Mullah Fazlullah in a US drone strike. Mullah Fazlullah was targeted in the province of Kunar, Afghanistan. Soon after becoming the leader of TTP, Noor Wali Mehsud issued major organizational and operational changes and orders. From their part of the strategy, the important guidelines were to limit the civilian target in their operations (Syed & Hamming, [2021](#)). By this, the TTP's new leader's aim and point was that indiscriminate targets and attacks on both military and civilian targets have resulted in public sentiments against them. This led to public support for the military operations and actions against TTP. The public support and sentiments resulted in the decline of TTP's support among the tribal people. At the time of Noor Wali Mehsud, the TTP was facing various splinter groups, organizational weakness, and major setbacks due to decisive military operations by the state of Pakistan. Since then, Noor Wali has strengthened TTP's internal factions, reunited various groups, and formulated new operational guidelines. It is important to mention that the TTP's command came under the historical tribes of Mehsud after his nomination (Zahid, [2019](#)).

Prior to becoming the new leader of TTP, Noor Wali was responsible for the group's operations in Karachi and was also leading the TTP's publication cell. To affirm his legitimacy and control in TTP, Noor Wali initiated several attacks by targeting prominent politicians, including Awami National Party (ANP)

leader Haroon Bilour, in 2018. The TTP linked their attack to the previous government policies of ANP. Noor Wali also claimed responsibility for Benazir Bhutto in 2007 (Khan, [2018](#)). On a similar note, TTP claimed responsibility for the death of PTI's leader, Ikrām Ullah Gandapur. Despite these, in December 2018, the TTP document circulated titled "The Code of Conduct: For the Mujahideen of Tehrik-i-Taliban," in which the Noor Wali outlined the militant intentions of TTP, organizational strategy, and reviewing structure, targets, and major martyrdom operations (Jadoon and Mahmood, 2018).

Noor Wali strengthened the organizational capacity of TTP by adopting a firmer centralized policy. Initially, the splinter groups were parted in TTP, and a personnel-centric approach was maintained. All his local and Wilayat commanders were directly and solely appointed by him. For Noor Wali, the lack of central control led to the fragmentation of TTP since 2014. Under these directions, the TTP introduced shadow organizational and administrative structures and appointed various ministers. The TTP appointed nearly nine shadow provinces and their commanders, central organizational units, and a leadership council (Syed & Hamming, [2021](#)). The commanders and ministers that were established were information, defence, political, intelligence, finance, a suicide brigade, various training camps, and a justice system based on Islamic jurisprudence. (Syed & Hamming, [2021](#)). The TTP adopted a policy to end and target the local influential elders (Maliks). Numerous elders were killed and targeted. The traditional structure of Pashtun society and the Jirga system was disfunctionalized by TTP through these attacks and strategies. Thus, the traditional local structure and the government influence were minimized or nearly ended, particularly in North and South Waziristan.

The TTP also expanded their activities across the tribal belt and KP. From the target of Chinese workers in Dasu Dam to the senior security officer of a secret agency in Punjab to the presence of TTP in Baluchistan, it marked the revival of organization strategy and a renewed approach to their attacks. The TTP and the Blouch Liberation Army (BLA) nexus surfaced as both organizations agreed on operational aspects against the state. The TTP also attracted and united various elements from Punjab and across the border from Afghanistan (Baloch, [2024](#)).

Conclusion

The purpose of the paper was to highlight Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategies in the tribal belt and the resurgence of TTP and other militant groups. From military strategy and active combat operations to the post-insurgency scenarios, there are various loopholes and issues that were mishandled by the government, civil administration, and security forces themselves. The fact is that the structural flaws in the post-merger scenarios and the lack of implementation and mainstreaming of the tribal belt led to the resurgence of insurgency once again. This pattern looks like it will continue in the foreseeable future. The society and political process need rational solutions and policy implementation. From a governance perspective, the tribal belt still awaits political reforms. The political culture, active participation in the democratic process, trust in government institutions, and effectiveness are indeed big questions. The people's trust in the local, provincial setup is fragile. There is a wide administrative and political vacuum, which the insurgents exploited and will be exploited in the future as well. The time and circumstances demand people's trust and the effectiveness of local institutions and democratic processes. Apart from these, the security vacuum and lack of monitoring post-operation scenarios and environment were not monitored and checked. The surrendered and fleeing insurgents were not monitored. Although the military operations successfully broke down the insurgent's chain of command and links, the issue remains and resurfaced after the return of the Afghan Taliban to power. The controversial process of negotiations with insurgents, particularly with TTP, exposes them and gives them a message and space. Although negotiations are a major way out, the terms of negotiation complicate the process and government morale. Through negotiation, the government showed them their flank point, which the TTP and other elements would expose. The main issue was that the people, local elders, were kept out of the negotiation process. The terms and conditions of negotiation were also ambiguous, and there was significant distrust among people over these negotiations. In fact, negotiations with a small chunk of insurgents are showing their weakness to them. In the last one, one can argue that the local people were kept out of the process and taken into trust. They simply sell out while negotiating with TTP.

It is necessary for every state and army to adopt modern counterinsurgency practices. Pakistan's army counterinsurgency efforts in ex-FATA and the tribal belt are subject to major change, challenges, and modification. There is a need for past experiences from the past counterinsurgency practices and tactics. This will lead to the adaptation of modern tactics while dealing with the new insurgency in ex-FATA. The basic theory and knowledge of counterinsurgency should be put into practice. The local conditions and instincts of insurgent recruitment, the round situation, and the assessment of the strategic environment play important roles in counterinsurgency campaigns. The moral and willpower from top command to soldiers on the ground is prime in this context. Similarly, the state and army need to relocate, reassess, and re-determine their strategic priorities and threat perceptions. The state's current or old security doctrine needs to be adjusted and shifted from India-centric to internal security calculus and parameters. The state should focus on the capacity building of the local people in ex-FATA and the tribal belt by improving economic and social education and building trust. The ex-FATA and tribal belt possess immense economic potential due to proximity to Afghanistan and geographical location. From Gursal (Bajaur) to Nawa Pass (Mohmand) and Torkham (Khyber), Kharlachi (Kurrum), Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan), and Angoor Adda (South Waziristan) entry and trade points, the tribal belt can become a hub of economic activities and mutual dependency. It is important to mention that if states provide economic incentives and trade facilitation on the above-mentioned routes, there will be little chance for the spoilers of peace and security. The shared border, shared trade, and economic activities are important needs of the time and should not be detached from counterinsurgency doctrines.

Therefore, the counterinsurgency doctrine and effort rely on the proper assessment of strategic priorities, and the center of any national security policy and doctrine must be relevant to the people's needs and realities of the on-ground situation. The threat environment and perceptions of Pakistan's national security policy should focus on the internal dynamics. Fighting enemies and insurgency within the state should be a source of concern for the policymakers.

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