



Legal Framework for Prosecution of Sexual Violence Cases in Bosnia

Qadir ULLAH	Lecturer, Department of Law, Edwardes College Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
Shujat Ali Khan	Principal, Edwardes College Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
Ayesha Durrani	Head of Law Department, Edwardes College Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
Ishaq Ahmad	Lecturer Department of Political science, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto University, Dir Upper, KP Pakistan.

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Corresponding Author:

Qadir Ullah

Email: advqadir50@gmail.com

Abstract: International tribunals have been very important in bringing criminals to justice involved in sexual violence. The tribunal has demonstrated that it is possible to effectively prosecute wartime sexual violence and has provided a forum for unfortunate victims to discuss their suffering. The tribunal is anticipated to be capable of prosecuting and exploring a variety of international and domestic sexual abuse. The legal framework and various laws that have been implemented to it have improved the regulatory and legal structure for the prosecution of national war crimes, which has led to a decrease in the various crimes of sexual violence on a worldwide scale. The article that follows is based on qualitative methods of research. An analysis of qualitative research methodology is presented in the following article.

Introduction

In numerous wars around the world, sexual violence has indeed been committed against women, men, and children. Address the widespread sexual abuse that occurs in war because it has the potential to harm individual lives, family members, and the community, which is why offenders are frequently not held accountable. While prosecutions are increasing, there are not many cases before international criminal courts. Consequently, sexual violence is frequently negligible or nonexistent on a national scale. However, a more recent emphasis has been on looking into and prosecuting sexual violence committed during wartime everywhere, particularly through the UK's Sexual Violence Prevention Program. However, before we can fully

develop the prosecution and investigation of sexual violence in war, we must understand what we are talking about. In order to adequately prosecute and investigate the variety of international and domestic sexual abuse, this section explores a number of minimally discussed problems surrounding wartime sexual violence (Scully, D. 2013).

The War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC), which was founded in March 2005 to carry on the employment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), faces significant challenges when it comes to the prosecution of crimes involving sexual violence. Between 20,000 and 50,000 wartime rapes have

been reported in Bosnia alone. Rape and other sexual violence crimes have historically gone unpunished by courts, especially during times of war, and several jurisprudential obstacles have prevented successful prosecutions. To give the families of the victims a sense of justice and to put an end to a culture of impunity, successful national prosecution of sexual violence crimes is essential (Fortune, M. M. [1983](#)). At least six sexual assault cases have been tried by the WCC so far, and there are still more cases pending trial or in the appellate process. This article looks at how the legal system in Bosnia has handled these cases of sexual assault.

Sexual Violence

Any violence decided to commit sexually or against sexuality is referred to as sexual violence, which is a general term. Because it causes two very different physical and mental harm, it affects both physical and psychological fitness. It is also linked to an increased risk of a variety of issues with sexual and reproductive wellness in both short- and long-term scenarios. As a result, "sexual violence" is characterized as any sexual act, attempt to achieve a sexual act, unwanted sexual remarks or advances, trafficking acts, or otherwise predicated on any offender, irrespective of their relationships, who commit violence against the victim in any situation, including but not limited to home and workplace. Compulsion can be of varying degrees of strength.

Aside from brute force, it can also involve psychological harassment, extortion or other forms of fear, sexual trafficking, mass rape, forced sexual condemnation, and sexual abuse against sexual violence, such as the worry of suffering physical harm if one loses a job or fails to land a desired one. Additionally, it can happen when the aggressor is incapable of giving consent, such as when they are inebriated, drugged, incapacitated, or mentally unable to comprehend. Even when the use of a penis, other parts of the body, or an object is minimal, sexual violence includes sexual, which is defined as body-forced

and otherwise permeation. The intent to commit rape is referred to as attempted rape (Tavara, L. 2006). Gang rape refers to acts of abuse committed by two or maybe more perpetrators or victims. Other sexual organ-related assaults, such as compelled mouth-penis, vulva, or perineum contact, can be classified as sexual violence. In the Study of the Secretary-General on April 15, 2017, on military conflict sexual violence, we discover that when it originally came to harassment during armed conflict.

"The term conflict-related sexual violence, as used in the present report, refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict. This link may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator (often affiliated with a State or nonstate armed group, including a terrorist entity or network), the profile of the victim (who is frequently an actual or perceived member of a persecuted political, ethnic or religious minority, or is targeted based on actual or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity), the climate of impunity (which is generally associated with State collapse), cross-border consequences (such as displacement or trafficking in persons) and violations of the provisions of a cease-fire agreement. The term also encompasses trafficking in persons when committed in situations of conflict for sexual violence/exploitation" (Wood, E. J. [2006](#)).

Legal Framework for Prosecution

International tribunals have been very important in bringing criminals to justice involved in sexual violence, which is the following.

International Criminal Court (ICC)

Sexual harassment, sexual subjugation, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sanitization, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable seriousness are all considered crimes against humanity and war crimes, according to

the international criminal court's Statute. Furthermore, the violence of enslavement (which may include interacting with people, particularly women and children) and sexual preference abuse of any identifiable group or network are prohibited as crimes against humanity. Although the Rome Statute's definition of genocide (which upholds the Genocide Convention of 1948) does not explicitly include explicit sexual assault crimes among its activities, the managing elements of crimes recognized by the ICC acknowledge that rape and other forms of sexual abuse may be punished in accordance with the Rome Statute (Frazier, P. A., & Haney, B. [1996](#)). Notwithstanding this basic understanding, people frequently believe that sexual violence is a crime committed by men against women and are rejected when they organize the pattern. In any instance, a review of recent years reveals that the reality of conflict-related sexual violence is far more perplexing than what observers have typically accepted. In this way, one can think about legal or alternative responses to these crimes. It is crucial to understand what sexual violence in conflict actually entails, which varies depending on the specifics of the conflict. While conflict-related sexual violence against women and young women has for a while been the subject of essentially selective inclusion, research into men and young men who are also targets of conflict-related sexual violence has revealed a significantly different impression (Des Rosiers et al., [1998](#)).

Male sexual assault has been charged in international criminal tribunals, despite the fact that the majority of court bodies of evidence focus on sexual assault against women. The ICTY has tried and convicted a few people accused of sexual assault against men, but the ICTR has only seen one conviction, and also the Special Court for Sierra Leone has not seen any. Male sexual abuse is currently being accused at the ICC in connection with Bemba Gombo (Central African Republic); however, despite there being abundant evidence of male sexual abuse during the conflict, it was not included among the complexities in the sexual

violence charges. Ladies and young women, including men and young men, are equally suitable for engaging in violent sexual conflict with men, young men, women, and young women. Although for a long time, only men and young men have recognized sexual violence in war, in some investigations, women and young women have been depicted as actual victims of conflict-related sexual violence by aiding others in inflicting sexual violence on the individuals involved or the people who demand sexual violence (SáCouto, S., & Cleary, K. [2009](#)).

The Democratic Republic of Congo, where military forces and militias from several African nations have been fighting for years for ideological control and access to the country's mineral wealth, was regarded by the ICC in January 2004. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's first trial at the ICC based on this situation began on January 26, 2009. The Central African Republic's state of affairs, which that nation discussed in December 2004, led to the third case against a Congolese warlord. The Movement Deliberation du Congo (MLB) President and presumed Commander-in-Chief Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is accused of two counts of CAH, including murder and rape, that occurred between 2002 and 2003. The Trial Chamber has not yet established a trial date after the Chamber of Pre-Trial formed charges and handed the case over to it on June 15, 2009.

Three of the six suspects from the Sudanese region of Darfur are still at large. The situation was discussed by the United Nations Security Council in March 2005, and the Bureau of the Prosecutor began its interrogation in June of that same year (Altunjan, T. [2021](#)). Both Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), the purported leader of the Janja weed militia, and Ahmad Muhammad Harem, the former interior minister of state and minister of state for humanitarian affairs for the govt of Sudan, are still at large. Both are thus accused of CAH, which includes rape, murder, violent transfer, harassment, vicious acts, and internment as an

uncovered liberty deprivation and torment. On March 4, 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, the president of Sudan. President Al Bashir is accused of CAH, such as rape, mistreatment, forcible transfer, killing, and forcible conversion. The dismissal of the genocide charge was deemed a legal error by the Chamber of Appeals on February 3, 2010. Because of this, on July 12, 2010, Chamber I of Pre-Trial issued a second warrant for Al Bashir's arrest on three counts of ethnic genocide against by the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups.

The prosecutor was given permission to investigate the alleged CAH during the occurrences in Kenya among June 1, 2005, and Nov 26, 2009, by the Compartment of Pre-Trial on March 31, 2010. It is estimated that as part of a massive and structured attack against civilian populations by criminal groups that operated with assistance from the major political parties, 1,220 people were killed, nearly 1,000 were sexually assaulted, with thousands of other rapes going unreported, 350,000 people were forced to flee, and 3,561 were injured. These non - state actor groups were not “state-like” or state-affiliated organizations, such as the armed services, police, or intelligence services, as has been noted by other academics. However, the Chamber of Pre-Trial declared that the organizations responsible for Kenya's post-election violence still fell under the definition of CAH as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute (Grey, R. [2014](#)).

International Criminal Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

On February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council (UNSC) expressed its concern over the ongoing claims of systematic violations of the law of war in the region of the former Yugoslavia. The UN SC, therefore, requested that the Secretary-General create a document with specific recommendations for effective and prompt implementation of this judgment, taking into account the suggestions by Member Countries. The governmentt of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (SFRY) rejected the creation of a court, citing seven key reasons why it opposed it ([Shenk, M, et al, 1999](#)).

- a) The creation of an ad hoc tribunal, in this case, was unfair because no attempts had been made to bring war criminals from other disputes to justice.
- b) Because of the Security Council's purported bias in the conflict, a tribunal it formed would not be unbiased.
- c) The political motivation was used to push for the creation of an international tribunal, which had never been done before in the field of international law.
- d) The creation of such a Tribunal was not authorized by the Security Council.
- e) It was illegal and arbitrary to invoke Article 29 of the United Nations charter to establish a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.
- f) Any State that valued its sovereign power and dignity would find the Statute unacceptable because of how many legal ambiguities it contained.
- g) The Statute violated the FRY Constitution, which forbids extradition.

On May 25, 1993, Resolution 827 was unanimously approved by the Security Council. In this resolution, the Council demanded that the Secretary-General immediately decide to ensure the International Tribunal's efficient operation. The Secretary-assignment General was to give Resolution 827 some physical form and establish the tribunal. The Hague was chosen as the location for the Court's seat in accordance with Resolution 827 concerning the tribunal's establishment. Inadequate funding was one of the major obstacles to the tribunal's early years of efficient operation. Richard Goldstone, the initial prosecutor, expressed regret that The Tribunal was the offspring of an insolvent parent, with all its consequences (Murphy, S. D. [1999](#)).

The tribunal took on a landmark role in investigating sexual violence during times of conflict in the former Yugoslavia and set the stage for an increasingly thorough investigation of such

wrongdoings worldwide. Since the tribunal's inception, investigations into allegations of rape of women, men, and children have been carried out. More than 33 percent of the total of those who received sexual assault sentences were thought to be responsible. One of the important things the tribunal has accomplished is these feelings. They made sure that agreements and displays that were only on paper were finally embedded and rejected for infringement throughout the 20th century. The Hague Convention of 1907, the first international agreement to explicitly forbid sexual violence, did not put an end to the exception for these breaches. For example, in the case after the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg rejected the Japanese military's treatment of comfort women. The core Geneva Conventions were proclaimed in 1949: *"Ladies, when all is said in done, will be shielded from rape, constrained prostitution or any sort of disgusting ambush. The conflict in previous Yugoslavia opened up the pivotal need to expel these memorable international laws from hypothesis and into the Court"* (Haan, V. 2005).

International Human Rights Court

The 1991 dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was a point of contention for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to mass advancement and intentional sexual violence, the planned conflict between the three main ethnic groups of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims resulted in the deaths of between 150,000 and 250,000 people. 1992 saw the continuation of the conflict between Croatia and Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs had taken control of 60 percentage points of Bosnia, including Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbian supporters and the Yugoslav Nationalist Army roamed Bosnia under Slobodan Milosevic with the extreme goal of creating Greater Serbia. The United Nations, which serves as a security force in Bosnia, acknowledged that its existence alone would serve as a deterrent against real wrongdoings. However, due to security concerns, a number of U.N. troops were withdrawn, forcing the

remaining peacekeepers to "bargain" with the Serbs to reduce incidents (Gaggioli, G. 2014).

As a result, the conflict was not resolved until 1995 because once NATO began shelling important Serbian locations. Sadly, the shelling attacks forced Serbian patriots into "safe territories" where they supported murders and sexual assaults against both people who had been cleared and U.N. negotiators. In 1995, the United States handled peace negotiations in Dayton between the three parties to the conflict, which necessitated dividing Bosnia into the Bosnian Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croatian Federation. Presidents Milosevic, Tudman, and Izetbegovic signed the final peace accord in Paris in December 1995, putting an end to the conflict. In order to support the sanctuary of the cease-fire and maintain the terms of the agreement, approximately 60,000 NATO military units would be activated in 1996 (Miller, A. M. 2004).

The United Nations (UN) has never in this way been able to protect citizens or exercise any of its peacekeeping responsibilities, but it has been amazingly resolute in its duty to look into the gravely destructive actions that occurred as a result of what the United States did. Richard Holbrooke, the secretary of state's assistant, was called *"the largest misstep of the West since the 1930s."* The first step taken by the international community was to create an impartial commission to look into and collect data pertaining to grave transgressions of the Geneva Conventions and other transgressions of International Humanitarian Law.

The Security Council finally received Resolution 808 in February 1993, continuing to insist on the Commission's proposal to establish a universal court after the Commission instructed examinations that led to three reports. The ICTY began operations in mid-November 1993 and took over as the main atrocities court following the World War II preliminary hearings in Nuremberg. A limited presence joined the ICTY's system fundamentally; it was designed to emerge for a short amount of time and accuse those most

responsible for real wrongdoings. After the establishment of the ICTY in July 2002, the fighting and killings in the former Yugoslavia continued for more than two years. The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed the Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on the Court (Court of BiH) to prohibit separation with the support of the ICTY. The establishment of a permanent legal system in Bosnia provided a framework for the protection of residents' rights. The three divisions of the BiH Court are legal, legitimate, knowledgeable, and bid. The War Crimes Chamber (WCC), sorted-out malfeasance, financial wrongdoing and desecration chamber, and a general wrongdoing chamber are the three sections of the Criminal Division. The WCC (Section I) of the Court of BiH is not restricted to a corrected consummation date or the impeachable offence of the most genuine break times in comparison to the ICTY's organizational structure. (Sellers, P. V. 2008). Furthermore, the WCC is independent of the U.N. Security Council's assessment.

The WCC's founding principles pursued numerous protracted stretches of advice and readiness, including an effective leave strategy for contract workers. The Court was designed to be an organizational court based on local law but with a strong sense of closeness in general. The Court operates in accordance with BiH law and is independent of the national court system set up in Sarajevo. Different groups compose the WCC, each with multiple global judges and a Bosnian Chairman. As part of the transition plan, the bench's makeup was changed from two Bosnian judges to one international judge between 2006 and 2007. By the start of 2010, the Court will entirely phase out all foreign employees and only employ Americans as part of its extensive efforts to support the ICTY's finalization process. A Special Department for War Crimes has been established by the BiH State Court Prosecutor's Office, in line with other aspects of justice and accountability in Bosnia (Alison, M. 2007). Five national prosecution groups and a sixth prosecution group will oversee evaluations for the

butcher of Srebrenica in the Special Dept for War Crimes. Accordingly, a global understanding between the organization of Bosnia - Herzegovina and the Headquarters of the High Representative resulted in the development of the Registry of the Court in 2004. The Registry was created with the goal of assisting and expanding the WCC, the Organized Crime Chamber (Section II), and the Special Headquarters for War Crimes' capabilities. The Registry's mandate includes, among other things, helping all judges and investigators in their work and supporting the express legal executive's capacity to prosecute crimes and adjudicate wrongdoing cases. The country's national justice institutions, such as the Department of Justice, the BiH Court, and the Prosecutor's Office, help the Registry staff a little bit.

The WCC may endeavor guilty parties using specific jurisdiction while supporting the ICTY case and enforcing "*Rules of the Road*," as was revealed. The Court may hear fresh accounts of local atrocities. A trying to organize a board of directors was established to handle locally occurring cases; in any instance, there are currently almost enough resources available to quickly handle these cases. In comparison to the ICTY, the WCC's current record will be considered in future preliminary hearings with much fewer financial resources. Rule 11bis, established by the courts, gives the WCC the authority to implicate ICTY cases that are submitted to it.

Judges are allowed by law to preside over proceedings or "*shift to lower or mid-level billed national jurisdictions*" prior to the opening of the court. On September 7, 2004, the instance of Ademi & Norac represented the first application of Principle 11bis. In response to the prosecutor's work, former ICTY President Meron created a different set of primers to determine the veracity of this novel application of Rule 11bis. The Regulation proved to be an indispensable and frequently employed tool for achieving the goals of the actualization process of transferring cases to domestic courts. The first person to genuinely

challenge the recently altered law was Radovan Stankovic. Stankovic argued that the ICTY judge's authority to uphold Rule 11bis had already been exceeded without the UNSC enacting a glaring change to the Statute. Based on the Security Council's certification that the Court has demonstrable circumstances to act in those capabilities under the Statute, the ICTY Appellate Chamber rejected this case and determined that the Court's judges corrected Rule 11bis to enable the trading of reduced or mid-level scorned to nationwide wards (MacKinnon, C. A. 2007).

Achieving Justice and Retribution

To be fair, every Criminal Court's primary objective is to achieve justice. Determining how well the central command of the Tribunals has performed will provide some insight into how effectively the situation in Bosnia has indeed been implemented to justice. This section will briefly summarize the accomplishments and fruitful outcomes of the tribunal since its founding and diagram some of the problems associated with using the ICTY to seek justice and effect change. Alone without tribunals, war criminals in Bosnia might never have been confronted with justice, or at least not to the same extent (Salter, M. 2013).

Retributive justice further reduces the risk of vengeance, prevents the perpetrators of war crimes and other wrongdoings against humanity from seizing control, and encourages the individualization of culpability, which relieves networks of the embarrassment of collective blame. Between 1994 and 1996, it approved 44 public charges, which fell to 17 between 1998 and 1999, and a similar percentage between 2000 and 2002. Deliberate surrender by lawbreakers has occurred (around 44 percent), just as SFOR has caught them (around 34 percent). Despite the Republic of Serbia's apparent resistance to ICTY criminal investigation and prosecution, nations like Austria, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Serbia, and Germany have aided in the capture of the suspects. Every one of the 161 elevated amount war alleged perpetrators has been accused of

being responsible for the monstrosities and murders perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the ICTY's fear (Clark, H. 2010).

The detention of Slobodan Milosevic, who became the first head of state to emerge before a global court and was charged with gravely violating the Geneva Conventions and obliterating Bosnia and Croatia, is thus a success story for the tribunal. According to Barria and Roper, the ICTY hails this progression of reconnaissance as a success because it forces travel restrictions and creates opportunities for the advancement of corruption, much like the discharge of war criminals from public office.

Even though the ICTY has been charged and detained, the perspectives of the victims must also be considered when assessing justice. International councils should be perceived as legitimate by those on whose behalf they work, as acknowledged by Fletcher and Weinstein, in order for those social orders to value their work. As a result, neither justice nor its full execution is possible, and in post-conflict communities, there is dissatisfaction among both victims and individuals. Displeased and unimpressed with the ICTY, citizens and victims of the Tribunals in Bosnia - Herzegovina were the unfortunate results of their work. In addition to feeling that the 161 accusations only scratch the surface of their guilt because such a large number of crimes have been committed, victims also think that the prison terms imposed by the Tribunals are "unacceptably lenient." In one or more of the three meditation camps in northwest Bosnia, Clark uses interviewers who are Bosnian Muslims as an instance (Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje). When participants, such as Dragan Kolundzija, Damir Dosen, and Predrag Banovic, were sentenced to three, five, and eight years in prison, respectively, we claim that we cannot be certain that justice was served (Flynn, A. 2015).

Unfortunate casualty satisfaction will nevertheless always be difficult because the ICTY has not successfully achieved justice; this impression persists. In 2010, 18.1% of people

differed somewhat, 29percent disagreed that the tribunal was a necessity for agreement and daily affairs, while 20percent disagreed somewhat, and 41.7percent could not help but denounce the tribunal's traditional primers. The tribunal's effect in Bosnia will, to some extent, depend on how these unfavorable perceptions affect Bosnian courts' ability to administer justice. While the tribunal claims to deliver justice to abused people through means of restitution, according to Clark, it has not provided them with what they require. Through its establishment and accusations, the ICTY has brought retributive justice to Bosnia, but individual exploited individuals have not been prosecuted. Even though there may be a sense of fairness, exploited people frequently disagree with the implications of the punishment.

For example, Clark argues that because the ICTY focuses primarily on high-profile cases, it does not focus on or indict low-level guilty parties (managing those in significant level power and power positions, for example, Milosevic). According to Clark, this final component is a depressing problem for Bosnians; the precise number needs to understand who was directly responsible for violence or decimation. As one female respondent in Kozarac stated, the arrest of Radovan Karadzic (previous former president of the Republic of Serbia and alleged of the butcher in Srebrenica) did not have any significant significance to her. When in doubt, the tragic setbacks tended to be continuously engaged by low-situating offenders sincerely subject to killing their loved ones. She didn't, however, expect to learn who had murdered her relatives in Trnopolje. It is crucial to keep in mind that although the ICTY focuses primarily on these highest levels of political and armed initiative, the majority of minor to moderate wrongdoers are dealt with in the local regional courts (Sumalla, J. M. T., & Hernández-Hidalgo, P. [2018](#)).

However, Bosnia faced formidable challenges in dealing with regional war crimes. The court system and prosecutors' offices were “*poorly funded, none specializing in war crimes, and*

continued to fail to handle the heavy workload of existing crimes,” in contrast to war crimes committed in the past. Although it is unnecessary to delve further into its complexities for the objectives of this paper, the organizational and legal framework for prosecuting national war crimes continues to be a complex issue. According to Clark, unfortunate casualties are dissatisfied because the ICTY emphasizes singular responsibility rather than the moral responsibility of states, which is the second instance of victims failing to receive what they require. Some Bosniak interviewees, for example, expressed displeasure with the idea of holding individual wrongdoers accountable and preferred to hold Serbia accountable instead ([Daly, K. 2017](#)). Clark demonstrates that despite the fact that international tribunals, such as the ICTY, concentrate on pursuing and charging criminal punishment, responding to the needs of victims and their preconceptions of justice.

Conclusion

All societies have a high prevalence of sexual violence against women, children, and occasionally men. Raped people exist in every society. Different environments have different rates of sexual violence. The way in which sexual violence is defined and measured, the negativity and shame attached to it, the degree to which reporting of abuse and assault is inspired, cultural norms, and the status of women and children in the community are possible causes. Nevertheless, it is crucial to measure prevalence, which is why there are international efforts to improve the methods and tools for doing so. It is challenging to develop adequate answers and prevention programs because there are insufficient data on the various kinds of sexual violence, especially in developing nations. Estimates of prevalence give decision-makers and advocate information to help with service and policymaking and to advocate for funding for it. Additionally, it reveals to us where to concentrate our prevention programs. The author of this article came to the conclusion that sexual assaults against women,

men, and children did occur during times of armed conflict but that those crimes were not prosecuted to the fullest extent possible. Furthermore, because there were few prosecutions before the international criminal tribunal, it destroyed the lives of people in various communities. Thus, the development of a legal framework for the prosecutors of sexual violence and the prosecution of the offenders by various tribunals has garnered attention on both a national and international level. Because of the legislative framework and the implementation of various laws, sexual violence investigations and prosecution have thus improved; as a result, the number of sexual violence-related crimes committed globally has decreased. Many criminals associated with sexual violence have been prosecuted by the ICTR and ICTY.

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